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INTRODUCTION 
This Article focuses on a fundamentally important concept in agency 
law: undisclosed agency. Agency law has profound economic importance. 
Over a career, an agent develops expert knowledge of markets in a 
particular geographical area and a range of commercial contacts. This 
information is highly beneficial to a manufacturer of goods seeking to sell 
those goods in different markets. When a manufacturer employs and pays 
an agent, the manufacturer can make use of the agent’s expertise and 
knowledge.1 Indeed, the manufacturer may select a particular agent 
because of a desire to “break into” the market in a different geographical 
area. This division of labor allows the manufacturer to form contracts with 
third parties in a highly efficient manner. 
Interposing an agent between two contracting parties—the principal 
and the third party—poses challenges for consensual theories of contract. 
Such theories conceive of contracts as bilateral relationships, emphasizing 
the requirement for consensus in idem, or a meeting of the minds, between 
actual contracting parties. These theories assume direct, not indirect, 
negotiations. In a common law system, in situations involving an agent, 
these challenges may be overcome by adopting an objective approach, 
treating the agent as the manifestation of the principal’s intention.2 The 
principal and third party are able to reach a consensus because the third 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2019, by LAURA MACGREGOR. 
 * Professor of Commercial Contract Law, University of Edinburgh. I wish 
to express my sincere thanks to Professors John Cairns and Kenneth Reid 
(Edinburgh University), Deborah DeMott (Duke University), John Lovett (Loyola 
University), Ron Scalise (Tulane University), and Peter Watts QC for their helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this Article; to Jason Wiese, Associate Director, 
Williams Research Centre, for his help tracing details of Samuel Livermore’s life; 
and to Dr. Severine Saintier (Exeter University) for her assistance with French 
law. Errors are the author’s responsibility. I am particularly grateful to Professor 
Lovett and Loyola Law School for the funding that allowed me to visit Loyola in 
April 2016 to carry out research on the topic of this article. 
 1. Manufacturers are discussed here because the focus of this Article is the 
sale of goods. A principal in an agency situation could, of course, provide services 
rather than goods. 
 2. Gerard McMeel, Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Agency, 116 
L.Q. REV. 387 (2000). 
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party treats the agent’s words and conduct as the embodiment of the 
principal’s intentions. In a sense, the agent is ignored, allowing theorists 
to maintain the fiction of direct negotiations. 
The approach described above makes sense when the third party is 
aware that she is dealing with an agent and that agent names her principal. 
The third party can assess the risks inherent in contracting with a particular 
principal before concluding a contract. What if the agent fails to disclose 
both that she is an agent and also—necessarily—the identity of her 
principal? The agent may behave this way because the principal has 
instructed her to do so: withholding such information can economically 
benefit the principal, in ways which are explored below.3 The objective 
approach to formation—which characterized the agent as the 
manifestation of the principal’s consent—cannot assist here. The third 
party is unaware that the agent even is an agent, and as a result, cannot be 
deemed to have reached consensus with a principal who is unknown to 
her. This situation—undisclosed agency in a nutshell—is nevertheless 
legally valid in most, possibly all, common law systems.4 It is generally 
agreed that under English law, a contract is initially formed between an 
agent and a third party, the third party in ignorance of the existence of a 
principal.5 The principal can later choose to intervene in that contract, 
suing the third party if that third party has failed to perform. If the third 
party becomes aware that a principal exists, the third party can also sue the 
principal. Undisclosed agency conflicts with the rule of privity of contract, 
providing the principal with rights and duties under a contract formed 
between two other parties—agent and third party. 
“One of the most unusual rules”6 in agency law, undisclosed agency 
is a problem which remains unsolved by theorists. The inconsistency 
between consensual theories of contract and undisclosed agency is not 
surprising: “[T]he doctrine [of undisclosed agency] was formed before 
such theories had acquired prominence.”7 Attempts to explain undisclosed 
agency using recognized concepts such as assignment, third party rights, 
                                                                                                             
 3. See infra Part I. 
 4. For English law, see infra Part IV. For analysis in other common law 
systems, see TAN CHENG HAN, THE LAW OF AGENCY 294–361 (2d ed. 2017); 
GERALD H.L. FRIDMAN, CANADIAN AGENCY LAW 157–70 (3d ed. 2017); GINO E. 
DAL PONT, THE LAW OF AGENCY ¶¶ 19.28–19.46 (3d ed. 2013). 
 5. PETER WATTS & FRANCIS M.B. REYNOLDS, BOWSTEAD AND REYNOLDS 
ON AGENCY ¶ 8-069 (21st ed. 2018); RODERICK MUNDAY, AGENCY: LAW AND 
PRINCIPLES ¶ 10.27 (2d ed. 2013). 
 6. MUNDAY, supra note 5, ¶ 10.28.  
 7. WATTS & REYNOLDS, supra note 5, ¶ 8-069.  
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or the law of trusts, have been unsuccessful.8 It has led agency scholars to 
design a theoretical framework for agency which omits undisclosed 
agency entirely,9 or categorize it as sui generis and not part of agency 
law.10 Undisclosed agency is usually justified purely by reference to 
commercial convenience.11 
Undisclosed agency is universally treated as a creation of the common 
law. The approach of T.B. Smith, a leading Scottish scholar writing in the 
1960s, is typical: it is a “specialty of English law, which Scots law may 
well have been right to adopt.”12 It is “one of the most important 
differences”13 between the civil and the common law traditions. This 
Article challenges the orthodox view that undisclosed agency is created by 
common law systems and adopted into other legal systems. It does so by 
carrying out a historical examination of two so-called “mixed” legal 
systems: Louisiana law and Scots law. These legal systems have been 
described as “mixed” because they comprise an inherently civilian basis 
overlaid by common law influence. The novel suggestion made in this 
Article is that Louisiana law and Scots law developed undisclosed agency 
as a commercial necessity before the relevant legal precedents from 
English law or the law of the other states of the United States became 
available to the courts in the mixed legal systems. This Article casts doubt 
on the assumption that undisclosed agency is necessarily an invention of 
the common law. 
It is certainly true that undisclosed agency developed from a practical 
context in England. Indeed, Roderick Munday traced the birth of the 
                                                                                                             
 8. See A.L. Goodhart & C.J. Hamson, Undisclosed Principals in Contract, 
4 C.L.J. 320 (1932). 
 9. See Thomas Krebs, Agency Law for Muggles: Why There is no Magic in 
Agency, in CONTRACT FORMATION AND PARTIES 211–12 (Andrew Burrows & 
Edwin Peel eds., 2010); McMeel, supra note 2, at 387 n.7. 
 10. This seems to be the more recent view of Krebs who concludes: 
“[C]onfusion will be reduced by realizing how very distinct disclosed and 
undisclosed agency are.” Thomas Krebs, Some Thoughts on Undisclosed Agency, 
in ENGLISH AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT AND COMMERCIAL 
LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HUGH BEALE 161, 181 (Louise Gullifer & Stefan 
Vogenauer eds., 2014). 
 11. Siu Yin Kwan v. E. Ins. Co. [1994] 2 AC 199, 207; WATTS & REYNOLDS, 
supra note 5, ¶ 8-069.  
 12. T.B. SMITH, A SHORT COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 777 
(1962). 
 13. Wolfram Müller-Freienfels, The Law of Agency, in CIVIL LAW IN THE 
MODERN WORLD 77, 81 (A.N. Yiannopoulos ed., 1965). 
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concept in English commercial contexts.14 The novelty of this Article’s 
argument is that undisclosed agency developed in roughly the same 
manner in the mixed legal systems. Orthodox reasoning contends: (1) the 
judges in the mixed legal systems identified a useful concept in a common 
law system—the United States or England; (2) the judges applied it in the 
mixed legal system, often with the thinly concealed aim of achieving 
desirable economic improvement; and (3) the concept opened the door in 
practice to new ways of contracting using agents. This Article reveals 
reported Scottish cases from the 17th century onwards, which suggest that 
a native Scottish concept may have developed before the Scottish courts 
experienced widespread English influence. In the case of Louisiana, the 
evidence is admittedly weaker. Yet drawing from a number of sources, 
this Article demonstrates that it is likely that undisclosed agency was alive 
and well before the courts in either Louisiana or Scotland began to apply 
precedents from English law or the law in other States of the Union. 
To draw conclusions on the development of Louisiana and Scotland 
law, it is necessary to pinpoint the first emergence of undisclosed agency 
in the United States and England—the legal systems which are thought to 
be the “originating” legal systems from which the transplants15 were made. 
In addition to performing this task, the careful historical analysis provided 
in this Article also illustrates the reasons why undisclosed agency was, and 
is, commercially useful. The Article highlights the role of commercial 
factors in the context of sale of goods from the 18th century onwards. 
Although the analysis in this Article is largely historical, the Article 
provides more than simply a backdrop for the modern law. The 
comparison between the two mixed legal systems reveals that in the field 
of unidentified agency, Louisiana and Scotland have developed novel 
solutions which are similar, but differ from the solutions which exist in the 
U.S. Restatement (Third) and English law, respectively. Unidentified 
agency occurs when the agent discloses that she is an agent but does not 
name her principal. These novel solutions continue to survive the influence 
of dominant common law neighbors. In the case of Louisiana, the novel 
solution was formalized during the revision of the Civil Code in 1997. 
Drawing on unpublished Minutes of Meetings of the Revision Committee, 
the author sheds new light on the influences which shaped the revised 
articles of the Civil Code. In the case of Scotland, the Scottish Inner 
House, the highest court in the Scottish legal system located in Scotland, 
                                                                                                             
 14. Roderick Munday, A Legal History of the Factor, 6 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 
221 (1977). 
 15. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE 
LAW (1974). For a more modern view, see MATHIAS SIEMS, COMPARATIVE LAW 
191–221 (2014). 
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recently recognized the novel solution.16 Both Louisiana and Scotland, it 
seems, continue to exhibit their independence in this area. This Article 
explores why this might be the case, asking whether it is because the 
versions of the concept offered by United States and English law are 
unsatisfactory. This may be true of English law; Francis Reynolds, the 
leading expert on English agency law, recently stated: “[T]he category of 
unidentified principals has not yet been completely thought through.”17 
The solutions adopted by Louisiana and Scotland may assist with this 
“thinking through.” 
This Article makes contributions to scholarship that are useful beyond 
the context of agency law. Essentially, the comparison allows the author 
to test assumptions about the way in which mixed legal systems behave. 
This Article contends that undisclosed agency is not a legal transplant in 
Louisiana law and Scots law. Nevertheless, both legal systems have been 
subject to extensive influence from the common law. In the case of Scots 
law, a nascent Scottish concept was replaced by the equivalent English 
concept. This Article challenges the view that commercial law in mixed 
legal systems is based solely on the common law and therefore not suitable 
for comparative study. Those who express this view tend to base it on the 
fact that mixed legal systems adopt the commercial law of a common law 
neighbor in toto in order to facilitate access to markets dominated by that 
common law neighbor.18 After complete assimilation, so the argument 
goes, no vestiges of the civilian basis remain. This proves not to be the 
case in the context of agency law. Early law in the two legal systems rests 
on a civilian basis, developing from the—essentially Roman—contract of 
mandate. Complete assimilation did not occur in Louisiana and Scotland: 
the example of unidentified agency proves that this is not so. The manner 
in which common law influence is applied to a mixed legal system and the 
speed of assimilation are worthy of analysis. Issues considered in this 
Article include the role of the treatise writers and the courts in the process 
of assimilation. It is also possible to ask whether the mixed legal system 
                                                                                                             
 16. The final court of appeal on civil matters for the Scottish legal system is 
the Supreme Court in London. The case in question, Ruddy v. Monte Marco 
(2008) SC 667, was not appealed to the Supreme Court. 
 17. Francis Reynolds, Unidentified Principals in Common Law, in AGENCY 
LAW IN COMMERCIAL PRACTICE 55, 68 (Danny Busch et al. eds., 2016). 
 18. Kenneth G.C. Reid, reviewing the body of Smith’s work, suggests that 
this was Smith’s view. Kenneth G.C. Reid, While One Hundred Remain: T B 
Smith and the Progress of Scots Law, in A MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM IN TRANSITION: 
T. B. SMITH AND THE PROGRESS OF SCOTS LAW 10 (Elspeth Reid & David L. 
Carey Miller eds., 2005). Reid repeats this view in The Idea of Mixed Legal 
Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 5, 25 (2003). 
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was a willing recipient of common law influence.19 Also considered is 
whether new rules are examples of choosing the best of the approaches 
offered by the civilian and common law traditions, or fusing rules drawn 
from both. Rather than rejecting commercial law as a topic of mixed legal 
system scholarship, this Article embraces it.20 
The second contribution to wider private law is this Article’s analysis 
of the role of a civil code in the development of a mixed legal system. A 
codified system, Louisiana, is compared with an uncodified system, 
Scotland. Vernon Palmer has suggested that a civil code can reinforce the 
civilian part of mixed legal systems, slowing down or impeding the 
penetration of the common law.21 This view is tested here in the specific 
context of undisclosed agency. The results are, in some respects, 
surprising. The presence of provisions in the Louisiana Civil Code which 
entirely conflicted with undisclosed agency did not prevent, or appear to 
slow down significantly, the development of undisclosed agency. The 
courts applied judge-made law which conflicted with the Civil Code for 
almost one hundred years until the Civil Code was revised in 1997. 
Palmer’s suggestion does not therefore seem to reflect experience in 
Louisiana in this particular context. His view is perhaps borne out as 
applied to Scotland, however, the legal system assimilating with English 
law relatively quickly, although not completely. 
The third contribution to wider private law relates not to mixed legal 
system scholarship, but rather to uncovering the exchange of ideas taking 
place between leading Scottish and United States treatise-writers in the 
early 19th century. This Article presents an important comparative 
discovery in the field of agency law. The Scottish institutional writer, 
George Joseph Bell, relied on the works of United States authors, 
principally James Kent, but also Joseph Story, in producing his works. 
Meanwhile, Kent and Story turned to Bell to justify their emerging 
                                                                                                             
 19. VERNON V. PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD 
LEGAL FAMILY 81 (Vernon V. Palmer 2d ed., 2012); see also Christopher K. 
Odinet, Commerce, Commonality, and Contract Law: Legal Reform in a Mixed 
Jurisdiction, 75 LA. L. REV. 741, 749 (2015) (referencing “voluntary 
assimilation”). 
 20. For an example of thoughtful comparative work from a mixed legal 
system perspective in the field of commercial law, particularly his discussion of 
“gradual” and “voluntary” assimilation,” see Odinet, supra note 19, at 747–48.  
 21. Vernon V. Palmer suggests that the civil law in the French group of mixed 
legal systems—including Louisiana—is “more highly resistant to common law 
penetration than the uncodified mixed systems.” Vernon V. Palmer, Mixed 
Jurisdictions, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 590 (Jan M. 
Smits ed., 2d ed. 2012). 
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positions on agency law. This Article explores why these authors turned 
to one another for inspiration. In a purely Scottish context, the analysis of 
Bell’s work on agency provided in this Article contributes another piece 
to the jigsaw which is Bell’s transformative contribution to Scots 
commercial law. 
Turning to the scheme of this Article, Part I explains the legal and 
commercial benefits of using undisclosed agency. Part II lays the 
groundwork for the comparison, exploring the reasons why Louisiana and 
Scotland have been treated as mixed legal systems. It also justifies the 
choice of a comparative approach to a commercial law topic—commercial 
law generally being considered as being derived exclusively from the 
common law in mixed legal systems. Part III provides a short history of 
the development of Scots law for those unfamiliar with that legal system, 
focusing in particular on its mixed nature.22 Parts IV to VII chart the 
emergence of undisclosed agency in its “originating” legal system—
English law, its appearance in the works of United States treatises on 
agency, in Louisiana law, and finally in Scots law. Part VIII offers 
comparative conclusions, and the Article ends with overall conclusions. 
I. THE NATURE AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF UNDISCLOSED AGENCY 
Undisclosed agency originated in the bankruptcy context, working to 
protect the principal from the agent’s bankruptcy. In a modern context, 
undisclosed agency is available at the principal’s option and can be used 
at any time; it is not limited to the context of bankruptcy. The way in which 
undisclosed agency protects the principal can be illustrated by using an 
example. Imagine that a third party (T) wishing to buy goods approaches 
A, who appears to be a seller. Although T does not know this, A is an agent, 
acting on behalf of an undisclosed principal (P), who is the owner of the 
goods. The existence of a principal, and the fact that A is an agent, are 
entirely concealed from T. A appears to be selling the goods in her own 
name. T buys the goods, and the goods are delivered to her. A has extended 
credit terms to T: T is not due to pay the price for another 30 days. At that 
point, A becomes bankrupt. A’s various creditors will look to A’s assets to 
satisfy their claims. P can, because of undisclosed agency, bypass A 
entirely and sue T directly for the purchase price. This is so even though P 
has no contract with T. Essentially, A’s bankruptcy will not impact P. T 
cannot be forced to pay the debt before the 30-days credit has elapsed. 
Once this period elapses, however, T can be forced to pay the purchase 
                                                                                                             
 22. Because this Article is published in a Louisiana law review, it will not 
provide a historical summary of the development of Louisiana law. 
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price directly to P, not A. The purchase price will not fall into A’s personal 
estate in bankruptcy, and therefore will not be available to A’s creditors.  
One could characterize undisclosed agency, at a basic level, as a 
purely procedural rule which prevents circuity of action: the principal has 
a direct action against the third party. The principal need not take the 
longer route of suing the agent, prompting the agent to sue the third party. 
In a similar way, the third party can sue the principal directly: this avoids 
the third party having to sue the agent and the agent suing the principal. 
Whether it is the principal or third party who makes use of the direct 
action, the ability to bypass the agent’s bankruptcy is an important 
practical benefit. 
If undisclosed agency protects the principal where the agent becomes 
bankrupt, are other parties disadvantaged? To answer this question, 
consider the positions of the other actors in the scenario: the agent’s 
unsecured creditors in bankruptcy; the agent; and the third party. Although 
the agent’s unsecured creditors may appear to be losers, that is not the 
case. The funds are the principal’s and do not belong to the agent, and the 
funds should not be available to the agent’s personal creditors. The claims 
of the agent’s unsecured creditors are therefore not pressing.  
The agent runs an increased risk compared to normal disclosed 
agency. In disclosed agency, the agent acts as a conduit, or channel of 
rights, and does not become a contracting party with the third party. In 
undisclosed agency, by contrast, the agent has a binding contract with the 
third party. The agent is at risk of an action for breach of contract by the 
third party. The agent can, however, increase the fee she charges to the 
principal to reflect this increased risk. Additionally, the contract which the 
principal concludes with the agent is likely to contain an indemnity 
covering the agent’s losses caused by such action. While it may be 
commercially useful for principals to act in this way, there is a price to be 
paid by the principal for doing so.  
Finally, with respect to the third party, the prejudice lies in finding that 
she is a party to a contract with a stranger. This will come as a surprise. 
The third party is, however, called on to perform the contract on the same 
terms as originally agreed. The only difference is that she must perform to 
a different party. If performance is, essentially, payment of a price, this is 
a very small inconvenience. Even if the third party is the seller of goods, 
the terms of the contract, including agreed delivery dates and locations, 
will not change. If we ignore the element of surprise, undisclosed agency 
is, in fact, beneficial to the third party. Although the third party thought 
she had one debtor—the agent—it transpires that she has an alternative 
debtor—the principal. Where the context is the sale of goods, there seem 
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to be no obvious losers in undisclosed agency—except perhaps the 
doctrine of privity of contract. 
A principal is not invariably entitled to act as an undisclosed principal. 
Under English law, a principal cannot do so where the contract between 
the agent and third party expressly excludes the possibility of a hidden 
principal, or where an implication arises from the terms of the contract that 
the agent contracts as principal.23 Nor can the principal intervene where 
the contract has a strongly personal element.24 These exceptions tend to be 
more relevant in contracts for services rather than sale of goods contracts. 
Having explained the legal concept, the stage is set to explore the 
reasons why principals find it so commercially useful. In the context of a 
purchase of goods, undisclosed agency can prevent sellers’ abusive 
behavior. A seller may inflate a contract price where the goods concerned 
are in scarce supply or where that seller knows that the buyer has deep 
pockets. The seller may inflate the price because she knows that the buyer 
relies heavily on a constant and uninterrupted supply of goods. 
Undisclosed agency allows the buyer to conceal her identity and can 
therefore prevent such behavior on the part of the seller, often acting to 
bolster specifically targeted competition legislation.  
Turning to the case where the seller, rather than the buyer, acts as 
undisclosed principal, in English law, a principal as seller is not required 
to disclose his identity where the contract is an “ordinary commercial 
contract.”25 It is assumed that, in such ordinary commercial contracts, the 
identity of the seller is unimportant. That is certainly the case in short-term 
executed sale of goods contracts. When the parties are not joined in a long-
term relationship, there is little or no unfairness to the buyer who is 
unaware of the seller’s identity. 
The agent, rather than the principal, may choose to use undisclosed 
agency. Agents are generally remunerated through commission; therefore, 
agents have important reasons to ensure that the principal sells goods to a 
third party using the agent as an intermediary on every occasion. If the 
principal sells directly to the third party, the agent will lose her 
commission. An agent may choose to keep the existence of a principal 
hidden, thereby ensuring that third parties always contract through the 
agent. The agent may spend a great deal of time finding and securing a 
third party as a contracting party for the principal. The principal may enter 
into successive transactions with that third party, each of which normally 
triggers the payment of commission to the agent. In such cases, the agent’s 
                                                                                                             
 23. WATTS & REYNOLDS, supra note 5, ¶ 8-079. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Siu Yin Kwan v. E. Ins. Co. [1994] 2 AC 199. 
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use of undisclosed agency to protect her ongoing commission stream is 
understandable. 
Whilst the context explored in this Article is sale of goods contracts, 
undisclosed agency has also proved useful in real estate transactions. In 
the United Kingdom, undisclosed agency has been used in the specific 
context of purchase by developers of land to be used for the construction 
of out-of-town retail parks or malls. The developer may need to buy 
different parcels of land from different sellers to make up the real estate 
on which the mall is to be constructed, and agents may be used on an 
undisclosed basis in order to do so. The principal is undisclosed to avoid 
the possibility that an individual seller may inflate the price because she 
knows that the viability of the development depends on all individual lots 
being successfully acquired. This is particularly the case where the area in 
question is required as a “sight-line”: these small pieces of land are located 
at the point at which the access road to the mall meets the main road; the 
driver exiting the access road on to the main road needs to have unimpeded 
vision left and right along the main road. Triangles of land on both sides 
must remain unbuilt upon in order to guarantee a clear view along the main 
road, ensuring that drivers leave the access road safely. The developer 
buys these areas of land to ensure that they remain undeveloped. These 
small pieces of land can become “ransom strips.” The owner of the strip, 
aware that the viability of the mall depends upon acquisition of the sight 
lines, can charge a high price. The developer may use an agent on an 
undisclosed basis to buy the strip of land in the hope that the seller will 
sell the land while unaware of its strategic importance and value. Such 
transactions often proceed successfully. Acquisitions of the development 
land as a whole may occur speculatively, before seeking planning 
permission. The use of agents in this way is not a purely British 
phenomenon—it has been suggested that Walt Disney Productions 
acquired parts of the land on which Disney World in Florida was built 
using undisclosed agents.26 
Less controversially, undisclosed agency is used in group company 
situations where, at the time of purchase of land, it is unclear which 
subsidiary in the group will ultimately become the owner of the land. This 
context poses theoretical problems, however. The legal precedents on 
undisclosed agency indicate that the principal must exist and have 
instructed the agent to act at the moment of formation of the contract.27 
                                                                                                             
 26. R. MANN & B. ROBERTS, BUSINESS LAW AND THE REGULATION OF 
BUSINESS 624 (12th ed. 2016). The author is grateful to Dr. Lorna MacFarlane for 
directing her attention to this source. 
 27. This problem was recently explored in the context of English law by 
Francis M.B. Reynolds. See Reynolds, supra note 17, at 55. 
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The principal may be hidden, but she must exist and be identifiable. 
Practices within group company situations flout this legal requirement. 
So far, this Article has focused on commercial situations only, 
reflecting the fact that undisclosed agency is, at least in English law, 
permitted in “ordinary commercial contracts.” The question which arises 
is whether it could be useful in a consumer context. In other words, when 
goods are sold to consumers, does it matter whether there is an undisclosed 
principal? Collins has suggested that in a modern world, the freedom to 
choose the party with whom an individual contracts has been eroded.28 
There may be benefits to consumers in concealing their identities. For 
example, news reports suggest that discrimination on grounds of ethnicity, 
race, or sex in the purchase of goods and services continues to take place.29 
A consumer fearing such discrimination could use an agent to make a 
purchase without disclosing her identity as principal. The seller, unaware 
of the identity of the purchaser, is less likely to refuse to contract. 
Consumers should, of course, not be forced to conceal their identities to 
gain free access to markets. Undisclosed agency could only provide a poor 
alternative to specifically targeted anti-discrimination legislation. As a 
result, there appear to be no pressing reasons to extend the concept to a 
consumer situation. 
Present in common law systems, undisclosed agency has also attracted 
the attention of civilian scholars, in positive terms.30 The next Part of this 
                                                                                                             
 28. Hugh Collins, The Vanishing Freedom to Choose a Contractual Partner, 
76 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71 (2013). 
 29. Growth in the use of apps such as Airbnb has led to reports of individuals 
being refused access to properties they have rented on grounds of race. This has, 
in turn, led to the creation of similar apps specifically for black users. See Ijeoma 
Oluo, An Airbnb Service for Black People? I Wish it Weren’t Necessary, 
GUARDIAN (June 8, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/ 
jun/08/airbnb-service-black-people-noirbnb-noirebnb [https://perma.cc/R5ZB-9 
D4R]. The U.K. Supreme Court recently decided that a refusal by a bakers’ shop 
to supply a cake iced with the message “support gay marriage” because of the 
religious beliefs of the bakery owners did not constitute discrimination on grounds 
of sexual orientation under the Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern 
Ireland) Order 1998 (SI 1998/3162 (NI21)). See Lee v. Ashers Baking Co. & Ors. 
[2018] UKSC 49. See also Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Co. Civil Rights Comm’n, 
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (a case on similar facts). 
 30. Jeroen S. Kortmann and Sebastian Kortmann conclude that undisclosed 
agency is preferable to the versions of indirect representation offered by civil law 
systems on the basis that undisclosed agency allows the principal to sue the third 
party and, in addition, the third party to sue the principal. Civilian versions tend 
to allow a direct action by the principal only. See Sebastian Kortmann & Jeroen 
Kortmann, Undisclosed Indirect Representation—Protecting the Principal, Third 
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Article lays the groundwork for the comparison before turning to examine 
Louisiana law and Scots law. 
II. THE CONCEPT OF A “MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM” AND AGENCY LAW IN 
MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM SCHOLARSHIP 
Writing in 1899, F.P. Walton said of both Louisiana law and Scots 
law: “[T]he law occupies a position midway between the Common Law 
and the Civil Law. It has drawn largely from both sources.”31 T.B. Smith, 
more than any other author, is well known for describing Louisiana law 
and Scots law as “mixed legal systems” and encouraging comparison 
between the two.32 His definition of a mixed legal system was: “basically 
a civilian system that had been under pressure from the Anglo-American 
common law and has in part been overlaid by that rival system of 
jurisprudence.”33 
Palmer, in particular, has developed this historical idea of a mixed 
legal system.34 There has not, however, been uncritical acceptance of 
Smith’s definition. The concept of a mixed legal system is “far from 
clear.”35 Every legal system is, in a sense, mixed.36 This Article does not 
intend to debate whether a category of mixed legal systems exists and, if 
so, the content of that category.37 Louisiana and Scotland have certainly 
been treated as “classic” or “traditional”38 mixed legal systems in the past; 
                                                                                                             
Party, or Both?, in AGENCY LAW IN COMMERCIAL PRACTICE, supra note 17. See 
also Hendrik Verhagen & Laura Macgregor, Agency and Representation, in 
ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 21. 
 31. F.P. Walton, The Civil Law and the Common Law in Canada, 11 JUR. 
REV. 282, 291 (1899). 
 32. T.B. SMITH, STUDIES CRITICAL AND COMPARATIVE iii (1962). 
 33. T.B. Smith, The Preservation of the Civilian Tradition in “Mixed 
Jurisdictions”, in CIVIL LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD, supra note 13, at 3. 
 34. See PALMER, supra note 19.  
 35. Reinhard Zimmermann, Daniel Visser & Kenneth Reid, Introduction, in 
MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: PROPERTY AND 
OBLIGATIONS IN SCOTLAND AND SOUTH AFRICA 3 (2004). 
 36. This is, broadly, the starting position of STUDIES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS: 
MIXED AND MIXING (Esin Örücü et al. eds., 1996). 
 37. It has recently been suggested that mixed legal system scholarship has a 
political nationalist motivation in Scotland, a claim which is vigorously resisted 
by this author. See Andreas Rahmatian, The Political Purpose of the Mixed Legal 
System Concept in Scotland, 24 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 843 (2017). 
 38. Jacques Du Plessis, Comparative Law and Study of Mixed Legal Systems, 
in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 480, 484 (Reinhard Zimmermann 
& Matthias Reimann eds., 2009). 
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there is already scholarship comparing the two legal systems.39 Louisiana 
and Scotland appear, to the current author at least, to face the same 
challenges of developing a legal system which has drawn from both 
civilian and common law traditions and the need to integrate both parts. It 
is useful and worthwhile to examine a legal system that faces the same 
problems as one’s own. 
To say that Louisiana and Scotland are mixed in nature is not to say 
that they share common legal sources. The civilian sources of Louisiana 
law are Spanish and French, whereas, as is explored in detail in Part III, 
the civilian sources of Scots law arise from the reception of the ius 
commune in Europe.40 On the common law side, the law of the other States 
of the Union has influenced Louisiana law, whereas English law 
influenced Scots law. More obviously, Louisiana law is codified whereas 
Scots law is not. The reason for the comparison carried out in this Article 
is to explore the manner in which the two legal systems have developed 
historically in a particular field of law. 
In the 1950s, Wolfram Müller-Freienfels pioneered a comparative 
approach to agency law.41 This interest has not continued into more recent 
times—with some exceptions.42 This is unfortunate given that agency law 
has been considered highly appropriate for comparative study, particularly 
by mixed legal system scholars. Analyzing the 1997 revision of the 
Representation and Mandate sections of the Louisiana Civil Code, 
Michael North commented that the term “mixed legal system” was 
                                                                                                             
 39. Arguably the first detailed comparison was carried out by John A. Lovett 
in A New Way: Servitude Relocation in Scotland and Louisiana, 9 EDIN. L. REV. 
352 (2005). See also MIXED JURISDICTIONS COMPARED (Vernon V. Palmer & 
Elspeth C. Reid eds., 2009). 
 40. O.F. Robinson, T.D. Fergus and W.M. Gordon, although noting that the 
ius commune is difficult to define, nevertheless state, “It is indeed the result of the 
coming together – in varying proportions from place to place and time to time – 
of local custom with feudal law, Roman law in modified and elaborated form, 
canon law and the law merchant.” O.F. ROBINSON ET AL., EUROPEAN LEGAL 
HISTORY 107 (3d ed. 2000). See discussion infra Part III. 
 41. Although his work spanned the entirety of agency law, articles specifically 
on the undisclosed principal include: Wolfram Müller-Freienfels, The Undisclosed 
Principal, 16 MOD. L. REV. 299 (1953); and Wolfram Müller-Freienfels, 
Comparative Aspects of Undisclosed Agency, 18 MOD. L. REV. 33 (1955). 
 42. Comparative work in this area has been carried out by the current author 
with Danny Busch. See THE UNAUTHORISED AGENT PERSPECTIVES FROM 
EUROPEAN AND COMPARATIVE LAW (Danny Busch & Laura Macgregor eds., 
2009). See also the work carried out in a European context, PRINCIPLES OF 
EUROPEAN LAW, STUDY GROUP ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE, MANDATE 
CONTRACTS (Marco B. M. Loos & Odavia Bueno Diaz eds., 2013). 
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“particularly apropos when discussing ‘agency’ concepts.”43 Holmes and 
Symeonides, writing a year later, suggested that the new Louisiana law 
was “worthy of a careful examination by other civil-law or mixed 
jurisdictions that recognize the same needs.”44 Such pressing invitations 
having been extended, it seems high time for Scots lawyers to respond. 
Commercial law in mixed legal systems is often identified as common 
law in nature, the civilian part being obscured.45 According to Palmer, this 
occurs because of “the requirements of commerce, perceptions of 
economic self-interest and the belief that civil law differences would be a 
hindrance to trade and should be eliminated.”46 Adoption of the common 
law both facilitates trade between the mixed system and the dominant 
economic power; it has, at times in the past, strengthened colonial rule.47 
The mixed legal system may be a willing recipient of the common law 
commercial rules,48 viewing those rules as a passport providing access to 
new markets. These are the ideas which may have led to a lack of 
comparative interest in commercial law. Few vestiges of the civil law may 
remain. Certainly, commercial law, broadly understood, has not benefitted 
from the same attention from mixed legal system scholars as parts of 
private law such as property law or family law.49 
Where does agency law lie in this debate? Given that the use of an 
intermediary is central to the development of a market economy, agency 
law could be classified as part of commercial law. This assumption may 
have led it to be overlooked by mixed legal system scholars. Given that 
the major focus of agency law is the formation of contracts, it could be 
classified as part of contract law; contract law tends to be treated as 
“mixed” in nature.50 The civilian influence on both Scots contract law and 
                                                                                                             
 43. Michael B. North, Qui Facit Per Alium, Facit Per Se: Representation, 
Mandate, and Principles of Agency in Louisiana at the Turn of the Twenty-First 
Century, 72 TUL. L. REV. 279, 281 n.6 (1997). 
 44. Wendell H. Holmes & Symeon C. Symeonides, Representation, Mandate, 
and Agency: A Kommentar on Louisiana’s New Law, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1087 (1999). 
 45. See supra note 19.  
 46. Palmer, supra note 21, at 597. 
 47. Du Plessis, supra note 38, at 490. 
 48. Palmer noted this point in relation to the Louisiana business community 
after the Louisiana Purchase. PALMER, supra note 19, at 81. 
 49. See Agency, in EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: SCOTS AND SOUTH AFRICAN 
PERSPECTIVES (Hector L. MacQueen & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006) (the 
current author’s chapter comparing Scots and South African law). 
 50. Scots and Louisiana contract law have been compared in MIXED 
JURISDICTIONS COMPARED, supra note 39. Scots and South African contract law 
have been compared in EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: SCOTS AND SOUTH AFRICAN 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 49. 
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Louisiana contract law can be seen in the presence of a native third party 
right in both systems51 and the lack in both systems of the common law 
doctrine of consideration. If agency is classified as part of contract law, 
then it may indeed be suitable for analysis by mixed legal systems 
scholars. 
The picture is, however, much more complicated. Agency law is not 
confined to either contractual or commercial contexts. Certainly, agents 
are most typically used in the formation of contracts. Agency is, however, 
highly relevant in the context of tort law. All three Restatements on agency 
cover tort situations comprehensively.52 Looking specifically at 
undisclosed agency, the Restatement (Third) of Agency covers the specific 
situation in which a third party suffers injury as a consequence of an 
agent’s tortious conduct when the principal is undisclosed. The United 
Kingdom Supreme Court recently considered whether it should hold an 
undisclosed principal liable for an agent’s negligent misrepresentation, 
and answered this question in the negative.53 There has been a good deal 
of confusion amongst agency scholars about the scope of agency law, 
amounting almost to an anxiety.54 Thus far, one can conclude that it is not 
possible to pigeonhole agency within commercial law, or indeed contract 
law. There is no reason why it should be excluded from the work of mixed 
legal system scholars. 
Looking specifically at Louisiana law, the presence in the Civil Code 
of a section on Representation and Mandate suggests that agency is treated 
as part of the civil law or private law. Although the Louisiana Legislature 
drafted a commercial code containing provisions on commercial agency 
                                                                                                             
 51. Scots law possessed a common law third party right, known as jus 
quaesitum tertio. See J. DALRYMPLE, VISCOUNT STAIR, THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE 
LAW OF SCOTLAND 10, 13 (2d ed. 1693, reprt. 1981). The concept has recently 
been enshrined in statute. See The Contract (Third Party Rights) (Scotland) Act 
2017. For Louisiana, see LA. CIV. CODE art. 1985 (2019). 
 52. In the United States, recognition of tort’s links with agency—and vice 
versa—did not happen immediately; tort law was considered not in the first, but 
in the second edition of Floyd R. Mechem’s TREATISE ON AGENCY (2d ed. 1914). 
This may be because Mechem came to the law of agency from the law of contract. 
I am grateful to Deborah DeMott for this suggestion. 
 53. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro Spa v. Playboy Club London Ltd. & others 
[2018] UKSC 43. 
 54. See Laura Macgregor & Deborah DeMott, Defining Agency and Its Scope 
I, in COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW: BRITISH AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 381 
(Larry A. DiMatteo & Martin Hogg eds., 2016); Laura Macgregor & Deborah 
DeMott, Defining Agency and Its Scope II, in COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW, 
supra, at 396. 
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in 1825, it was never enacted.55 The reasons why are not particularly clear. 
Richard Kilbourne suggests that the legislature abandoned it rather than 
rejected it, “because it either doubted its power to legislate in the area of 
commercial law or recognized a potential area of conflict between the state 
and federal judicial systems.”56 Failure to enact a commercial code 
undoubtedly paved the way for common law influence. The fact that 
codification of commercial law was even considered is important—to 
enact a commercial code is a “uniquely civilian approach.”57 This failure 
led Kilbourne to describe the attitude towards the State’s civilian heritage 
as “somewhat muddled.”58 
The uncodified nature of Scots law makes it more difficult to classify 
agency law in that legal system. Niall Whitty observes: “[N]o clear 
division exists between commercial law and large swathes of the law of 
property and obligations.”59 The early history of agency law in Scotland is 
certainly civilian—the contract of mandate, a gratuitous contract which 
was the forerunner of agency, is considered in detail in the works of the 
Scottish institutional writers, Stair, Bankton, and Erskine, writing from the 
late 17th century onwards.60 By the 19th century, Bell developed the 
gratuitous contract of mandate into modern agency law.61 United Kingdom 
statutory “codifications” of commercial law taking place in the late 19th 
century then affected agency law.62 In textbooks, there has been a tendency 
                                                                                                             
 55. RICHARD H. KILBOURNE, JR., LOUISIANA COMMERCIAL LAW: THE 
ANTEBELLUM PERIOD 25 (1980); Max Nathan, Jr., In Search of a Missing Link: 
Edward Livingston and the Proposed Code of Commerce for Louisiana, 48 TUL. 
L. REV. 43 (1973–74). 
 56. KILBOURNE, JR., supra note 55, at 33. 
 57. Id. at 25. 
 58. Id. at 28. 
 59. Niall R. Whitty, The Civilian Tradition and Debates on Scots Law, 1996 
J. S. AFR. L. 227, 449 (1996). 
 60. DALRYMPLE, supra note 51; A. MCDOUALL, LORD BANKTON, AN 
INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND (1751–53, reprt. Stair Society Vols. 41–
43, 1993–95); J. ERSKINE, AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND (1st ed. 1773) 
(report by the Edinburgh Legal Education Trust 2014 with an introduction by 
Kenneth G.C. Reid). 
 61. GEORGE J. BELL, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND, Vols. 1 & 
2 (2d ed. 1810).  
 62. See Bills of Exchange Act 1882, Partnership Act 1890, Sale of Goods Act 
1893 and Marine Insurance Act 1906; Alan Rodger, The Codification of 
Commercial Law in Victorian Britain, 108 L.Q. REV. 570 (1990). Under the 
Factors Act 1889 (applied to Scotland by the Factors (Scotland) Act 1890), 
mercantile agents left in possession of goods with the consent of the principal can 
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to treat it as part of contract law, appearing as an extra chapter at the end 
of the book.63 Only in 2013 do we see publication of the first major book 
dedicated solely to Scottish agency law.64 As in the United States, a 
modern view of Scots agency law would recognize agency’s relevance to 
tort—delict, in Scots law.65 Agency law also interfaces with the law of 
unjustified enrichment.66  
This Part has introduced Louisiana law and Scots law as mixed legal 
systems. It has also noted assumptions that, in commercial law, mixed 
legal systems assimilate completely with the common law. Classification 
of agency law as part of commercial law may have led it to be overlooked 
by mixed legal system scholars, concluding that few vestiges of the civil 
law remain. It has been argued here that agency law permeates widely, 
through commercial law, contract law, tort law, and enrichment law. There 
is therefore every reason for mixed legal systems scholars to consider it. 
III. NATURE AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SCOTS LAW 
This Part provides a short summary of the development of Scots law 
to assist readers who are unfamiliar with the nature and sources of the 
Scottish legal system. Crucially, this Part explains why Scots law has been 
described as mixed in nature. 
A. The Reception of Roman Law 
Roman law was received into Scots law in different ways and at 
different stages.67 The canon law of the church courts provided a route for 
the application of Romano-canonical procedure in Scotland. From the 
middle ages, canon lawyers in Scotland applied Roman law. With the 
development of a central court in 1532—the Court of Session—the Court 
continued to use the Romano-canonical procedure, and the canon lawyers 
                                                                                                             
pass title to those goods to third parties acting in good faith. See LAURA 
MACGREGOR, THE LAW OF AGENCY IN SCOTLAND ¶¶ 3-07, 3-08 (2013). 
 63. WILLIAM M. GLOAG, THE LAW OF CONTRACT (2d ed. 1929). The classic 
text on Scots contract law, WILLIAM W. MCBRYDE, THE LAW OF CONTRACT IN 
SCOTLAND (3d ed. 1997), does not cover agency law.  
 64. This is THE LAW OF AGENCY IN SCOTLAND (2013) by the current author. 
 65. See MACGREGOR, supra note 62, ch. 13. 
 66. A recent line of Scottish cases sought to use agency law to resolve 
problems caused in a classic enrichment situation, payment of another party’s 
debt. See Laura J. Macgregor & Niall R. Whitty, Payment of Another’s Debt, 
Unjustified Enrichment and ad hoc Agency, 15 EDIN. L. REV. 57 (2011). 
 67. PAUL DU PLESSIS, BORKOWSKI’S TEXTBOOK ON ROMAN LAW 389–94 
(5th ed. 2015). 
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dominated its personnel.68 Bill Gordon suggested that Scotland should be 
aligned with other European nations, that the civil law was introduced into 
Scotland initially through canon law and the involvement of canon lawyers 
in the dispensation of justice in Scotland.69 
Legal education is an important part of this story. Scottish students 
attended universities in France and Italy from at least the 13th century.70 
Law appears, at this period, to have been a popular choice for Scottish 
students studying abroad.71 The creation of Scottish law schools did not 
initially alter this situation significantly. Although it became possible to 
study law at the Universities of St. Andrews and Glasgow from 1412 and 
1451, respectively, Scottish students continued to attend universities in 
France and Germany.72 After the Reformation, study in the Netherlands 
became popular, and this popularity continued up until the first half of the 
18th century.73 Thus, before the Reformation, Scots students studied canon 
law, and later civil law. These ideas were applied by them in their 
professional lives upon returning to legal practice in Scotland.74 
Historically, large swathes of the Scottish legal profession had been 
educated in Europe, and the law that they brought back to Scotland was 
civilian in nature. It was only at the beginning of the 18th century, with 
                                                                                                             
 68. Id. at 390 (citing J.J. Robertson, The Canon Law Vehicle of Civilian 
Influence with Particular Reference to Scotland, in THE CIVILIAN TRADITION AND 
SCOTS LAW: ABERDEEN QUINCENTENARY ESSAYS 117 (D.L. Carey-Miller & R. 
Zimmermann eds., 1997)). 
 69. William. M. Gordon, Scotland as a Mixed Jurisdiction, in 1 AU-DELÀ DES 
FRONTIÈRES. MÉLANGES DE DROIT ROMAIN OFFERTS À WITOLD WOŁODKIEWICZ 
323–31 (M. Zablocka et al. eds., 2000) (available in William M. Gordon, ROMAN 
LAW: SCOTS LAW AND LEGAL HISTORY, SELECTED ESSAYS 343, 346 (2007)). 
 70. ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 40, at 121; G. Campbell H. Paton, The Dark 
Age, in AN INTRODUCTION TO SCOTTISH LEGAL HISTORY 1329–1532 (Stair 
Society vols. 20, 23 1958). 
 71. Research by D.E.R. Watt has indicated that, between 1340–1410, 400 
graduates studied abroad. It was possible to identify the subject choice of 230 of 
them: 120 pursued a law degree, whereas 110 pursued an arts degree. Of those 
arts students, a further 80 went on to study law. See D.E.R. Watt, University 
Graduates – Scottish Benefices Before 1440, 77, 79 15 R. S. C. H. S. (1964). The 
author is grateful to Professor John W. Cairns for drawing this source to her 
attention. 
 72. ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 40, at 121.  
 73. John W. Cairns, Historical Introduction, in 1 A HISTORY OF PRIVATE 
LAW IN SCOTLAND, at Introduction and Property 156 (K. Reid & R. Zimmermann 
eds., 2000). 
 74. For example, William Elphinstone became Bishop of Aberdeen and 
Chancellor of Scotland. See DU PLESSIS, supra note 67, at 390. 
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the revival of the law professorship at the University of Glasgow, and the 
creation of three chairs in law at the University of Edinburgh, that legal 
education in Scotland flourished.75 The cessation of the tradition of 
studying abroad is, for John Cairns, a significant factor in breaking with 
the ius commune.76 
During the late 15th century, the use of Roman law continued in 
practice, particularly in Roman-derived arguments Scottish advocates 
used in court77—advocates being the body of legal professionals having 
rights of audience in the higher courts in Scotland and the Supreme Court 
in London.78 A qualification in Roman law, whilst not necessary for entry 
to the solicitors’ profession in Scotland,79 was a requirement for entry to 
the Faculty of Advocates in the 17th century and remains a requirement 
today.80 
B. The Institutional Period and Union with England 
Of particular importance in the development of Scots law is the role 
of the Scottish Institutional writers who wrote from the 17th century 
onwards. Their works continue to be regarded as formal sources of law 
and are used in modern Scottish court pleadings and judgments, albeit 
sparingly. In the earliest Institutional work, Thomas Craig’s Jus Feudale, 
written around 1600,81 Craig explained: “[W]e are bound by the laws of 
the Romans only in so far as they are congruent with the laws of nature 
and right reason.”82 Bill Gordon suggested that the most significant of the 
institutional writers, James Dalrymple and Viscount Stair, used the civil 
                                                                                                             
 75.  John W. Cairns, Institutional Writings in Scotland Reconsidered, 4 J. 
LEGAL HIST. 76, 94–95 (1983). 
 76. Cairns, supra note 73, at 165.  
 77. DU PLESSIS, supra note 67, at 390. 
 78. Members of the Scottish Faculty of Advocates had exclusive rights of 
appearance in the higher courts in Scotland until the passing of the Law Reform 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Scotland Act 1990. In terms of s. 24, Scottish 
solicitors were given the right to become solicitor-advocates having rights of 
audience in the higher courts. A solicitor must meet a number of requirements, 
including success on the appropriate exams. 
     79. Solicitors form the main branch of the legal profession in Scotland, see 
Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1980, s. 65. For advocates, see supra note 78. 
 80. DU PLESSIS, supra note 67, at 390. 
 81. John Cairns, The Breve Testatum and Craig’s Ius Feudale, 56(3) 
TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR RECHTSGESCHIEDENIS 311, 311–32 (1988). 
 82. 1 Tit. II, 14, T. CRAIG, JUS FEUDALE (1655). Although written in 1603, it 
was published in 1655. 
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law as inspiration where no native legal rule existed.83 At this stage, the 
written sources of the ius commune were important because there was little 
written law in Scotland.84 
Toward the end of the 17th century, the economic benefits to Scotland 
of Union, including access to English trade routes with the colonies, 
proved irresistible to the Scots. Although the Treaty of 1707 created a 
Union between Scotland and England, its practical effect was rather to 
subsume Scotland into England.85 The English Parliament, for example, 
became the Parliament of the United Kingdom. With regard to the separate 
Scottish legal system, the Treaty of Union provided in its 18th article for 
the application in Scotland of the same laws on trade, customs, and excise 
as in England. A distinction was made, however, between laws concerning 
“Publick Right, Pollicy and Civil Government” and those concerning 
“Privat Right.”86 The former could be made the same throughout the 
United Kingdom; with regard to the latter, “no alteration may be made in 
Laws which concern Privat Right Except for the evident utility of the 
Subjects within Scotland.”87 
The 19th article of the Treaty of Union preserved the two highest 
courts in Scotland, the Court of Session—with jurisdiction over civil 
matters—and Court of Justiciary—with jurisdiction over criminal 
matters—“in all time coming within Scotland.”88 The Treaty was, 
however, silent on the possibility of appeals from the Scottish Court of 
Session to the House of Lords in London. According to John Cairns, it was 
“simply assumed” that appeal did, in fact, lie.89 Following the Union, there 
was swift growth of Scottish appeals to the House of Lords. Indeed, in the 
late 18th and early 19th centuries, the vast majority of the cases heard by 
the House of Lords were Scottish appeals,90 a truly remarkable fact given 
that the population of England may have been more than five times larger 
                                                                                                             
 83. William M. Gordon, Roman Law in Scotland, in THE CIVIL LAW 
TRADITION IN SCOTLAND 13, 29 (Robin Evans-Jones ed., 1995). 
 84. Cairns, supra note 73, at 101.  
  85. Union was effected by two Acts: firstly, the Union with Scotland Act 
1706 (c. 11) passed by the English Parliament, and, secondly, the Union with 
England Act 1707 (c. 7), passed by the Scottish Parliament. These Acts put into 
effect the Treaty of Union 1707. 
     86. Treaty of Union 1707, art. XIX. 
 87. APS, XI, appendix, 203. 
     88. Treaty of Union 1707, art. XIX. 
 89. Cairns, supra note 73, at 123–24.  
 90. N.T. Phillipson noted that from 1794–1807, 419 of the 501 appeals to the 
Lords came from Scotland. 37 THE SCOTTISH WHIGS AND THE REFORM OF THE 
COURT OF SESSION 1785-1830 85 (Stair Society 1990). 
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than Scotland at that time.91 There was not then—and is not now—any 
legal rule specifying a minimum number of Scottish-trained judges who 
must sit to hear Scottish appeals to the Supreme Court.92 By convention, 
Scottish Justices take the lead in modern appeals from Scotland. At times 
English judges in this court do not seem to have been aware of the 
differences between Scots and English law. Appeals to the House of Lords 
have therefore acted as a route for English influence into Scots law.93 The 
Supreme Court remains the final court of appeal for Scots law in civil but 
not criminal matters, the High Court of Justiciary in Edinburgh being the 
final court of appeal for the latter. 
C. The Development of Scots Commercial Law 
In commercial matters in the late 18th century, legislative activity focused 
on the law of bankruptcy.94 The following statement made by a Scottish 
judge, Lord Hailes, in 1774, certainly suggests that English law—and not 
the civil law—had become the main point of reference for the Scottish 
courts at this time: “We in Scotland are in the helpless infancy of 
commerce; . . . On a mercantile question, especially concerning insurance, 
I would rather have the opinion of English merchants, than of all the 
theorists and all the foreign ordinances in Europe.”95 
In 1826 the institutional writer, George Joseph Bell, produced his 
Commentaries on the Law of Scotland and on the principles of mercantile 
jurisprudence: a book that had developed from an earlier text focusing 
specifically on bankruptcy law.96 Bell drew on many different influences 
in his work, including French law, United States law, and English law. 
                                                                                                             
 91. An internet search suggests that, in 1707, the Scottish population may 
have been about 1 million, and the English population 5.5 million. Brian Logan, 
How Scotland in 2011 Compares to 1707, GUARDIAN (May 20, 2011, 2:00 PM) 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/may/20/how-scotland-compares-1707-
2011 [https://perma.cc/7BSS-X2KK]; Gerald Warner, History of the Union—Part 
Two 1707-1783, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 11, 2007, 12:01 AM) http://www.tele 
graph.co.uk/news/uknews/1572149/History-of-the-Union-Part-two-1707-1783.h 
tml [https://perma.cc/7RLS-ZGF6]. 
 92. The Supreme Court, created in 2009 under the Constitutional Reform Act 
2005, s. 23(1), is the statutory successor to the House of Lords. Its judges are 
known as “Justices.”  
 93. Cairns, supra note 73, at 124.  
 94. This includes the Bankruptcy Act 1772. 
 95. David Dalrymple, Lord Hailes, Decisions of the Lords of Council and 
Session from 1766 to 1791 622 (M.P. Brown ed., 1826) (Dec. 16 1774) (cited by 
Cairns, supra note 73, at 162). 
 96. TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY IN SCOTLAND (1800–04). 
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Commentaries has institutional status—that is, is treated as an actual 
source of law—and is notable for extensive reliance on English case law. 
It stands at the end of what Lord Cockburn called the “last purely Scotch 
age.”97 Progress from here was singularly focused on greater integration 
with England. 
At the end of the 19th century, commercial law was “codified”98 for 
the United Kingdom, and indeed for other parts of the Empire, such as 
India. The United Kingdom passed statutes applying to important areas of 
commercial law, such as bills of exchange, sale, partnership, and 
insurance.99 These codifying statutes were to have long-lasting impact, and 
some can still be found on the statute books in largely the same form.100 
The results of such codifications were not always wholly positive for Scots 
law. Partnership law illustrates this point. There are significant differences 
between Scots and English partnership law: crucially, the Scottish 
partnership has separate legal personality whereas the English partnership 
does not.101 The Bill preceding the Partnership Act of 1890, originally 
drafted to apply to England alone, was amended in its final stages of 
passage through Parliament so that it applied also to Scotland.102 This 
decision, which the Scottish Faculty of Advocates somewhat surprisingly 
                                                                                                             
 97. 1 HENRY COCKBURN, LIFE OF LORD JEFFREY WITH A SELECTION FROM 
HIS CORRESPONDENCE 157 (1852) (cited by Cairns, supra note 73, at 177).  
 98. The word “codified” is used here in a non-technical sense. The impact of 
these statutes was not to produce a “code” as that word is understood in the civil 
law tradition. 
 99. For the individual Acts, see supra note 62; Rodger, supra note 62. 
 100. This comment applies to the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 and the 
Partnership Act 1890. The Marine Insurance Act 1906 remained on the statute 
book largely untouched until the enactment of recent legislation, including, for 
business insurance, the Insurance Act 2015, which came into force in 2016. 
 101. See Partnership Act 1890 REGNAL. 53 and 54 VICT. § 4, ¶ 2: “In Scotland 
a firm is a legal person distinct from the partners of whom it is composed.” This 
difference impacts the idea of partners as agents, s. 5 of the Act being loosely 
drafted to take this into account: “Every partner is an agent of the firm and his 
other partners.” Id. With the passing of the Limited Liability Partnership Act in 
2000, English law, for the first time, acquired a type of partnership with separate 
legal personality. A further difference between Scots and English law relates to 
the sharing of liabilities in partnerships. The concepts joint liability and several 
liability have different meanings in Scots and English law. Section 9 of the 1890 
Act required to take this into account: “Every partner in a firm is liable jointly 
with the other partners, and in Scotland severally also, for all the debts and 
obligations of the firm incurred while he is a partner.” Id. 
 102. Rodger, supra note 62, at 578.  
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supported,103 was made notwithstanding the significant differences 
between Scots and English partnership law. The end result is that, to quote 
George Gretton, “it is necessary to avoid reading the Act in a literalistic 
manner.”104 More recently, the Government failed to enact law reform 
emanating from a joint project by the Scottish and English Law 
Commissions which would have removed these problems.105 To conclude 
this Part, one can say that English law certainly influenced Scots law. 
Legislative change applying to the United Kingdom as a whole has not 
always taken account of the important differences that exist between the 
two legal systems. 
D. When Did Scots Law Become Mixed in Nature? 
Views differ on when Scots law became a mixed legal system. On one 
side of the debate are Hector MacQueen and David Sellar, who stated: “It 
has been a ‘mixed’ system from the very beginning.”106 In asserting that 
Scots law has always been mixed, MacQueen specifically contrasted Scots 
law with Louisiana law, characterizing the latter as a system in which the 
civil law was overlaid with the common law.107 On the other side of the 
debate is Niall Whitty, who described this view as “misleading,”108 and 
questioned whether evidence of English influence existed before the 
creation of the United Kingdom in 1707.109 Kenneth Reid and Reinhard 
Zimmermann identify the second half of the 19th century, the time of the 
great United Kingdom commercial codifications, as the main period of 
                                                                                                             
 103. The Faculty of Advocates is the part of the Scottish legal profession 
which, at that time, had exclusive rights to appear in the higher Scottish courts, 
namely the Outer and Inner Houses of the Court of Session and the House of Lords 
in Scottish appeals. 
 104. George L. Gretton, Partnership Property, JUR. REV. 163, 168 (1987). 
 105. “Report on Partnership Law” (Law Commission No 283, Scottish Law 
Commission No 192) (Nov. 2003). 
 106. Hector MacQueen & David Sellar, Unjust Enrichment in Scots Law, in 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT, THE COMPARATIVE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LAW OF 
RESTITUTION 298 (E.J.H. Schrage ed., 1995). Both authors reiterated their view 
more recently. See Hector L. MacQueen, Scots law, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 21, at 789; David Sellar, Scots Law: Mixed From 
the Very Beginning? A Tale of Two Receptions, 4 EDIN. L. REV. 3 (2000). 
 107. MacQueen, supra note 106, at 789. According to MacQueen, South 
Africa, Québec, and Sri Lanka resemble Louisiana law in this respect. Id. 
 108. Whitty, supra note 59, at 232. 
 109. Id. at 442. 
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reception of English law.110 One can conclude therefore that, while most 
authors agree that Scots law is a mixed legal system, they disagree on the 
point at which English law significantly influenced it. 
IV. UNDISCLOSED AND UNIDENTIFIED AGENCY IN ENGLISH LAW 
To determine whether undisclosed agency is a legal transplant or a 
native development in Louisiana law and Scots law, it is necessary to 
identify the point at which it arose in the legal systems where it is thought 
to have originated. In the Parts which follow, the development of the 
concept in English law and in the works of 19th century United States 
treatise-writers is identified. The analysis then turns to the appearance of 
the doctrine in Louisiana law and Scots law. 
A. The Role of the Factor 
Undisclosed agency developed in English law from the 16th century 
onwards from the use of commercial actors known as “factors.” The factor 
was a type of agent who sold goods for his principal in his own name, 
without disclosing the existence of the principal.111 The factor was 
remunerated through commission on sales transacted. Although the term 
factor was not used with a high degree of accuracy,112 the factor can 
nevertheless be distinguished from other commercial actors, specifically 
the broker and the commission agent. The broker did not, in general, buy 
or sell goods in his own name.113 The commission agent was generally 
unable to create contractual privity between his principal and a third 
party.114 
Factors were specifically linked to foreign trade. In essence, a 
geographically remote principal could consign goods for sale to a factor in 
a different country. The factor could sell those goods to a buyer local to 
                                                                                                             
 110. 1 A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN SCOTLAND, Introduction and Property, 
preface, 12–13 (2000). 
 111. Baring v. Corie (1818) 1 B & Ald 137 per Abbott, CJ at 143. See Munday, 
supra note 14; Gerard H.L. Fridman, Undisclosed Principals and the Sale of 
Goods, in AGENCY LAW IN COMMERCIAL PRACTICE, supra note 17, ¶ 5.02. 
 112. Munday, supra note 14, at 229. 
 113. Id. at 225. The broker may have later developed an ability to act in his 
own name. See S.J. STOLJAR, THE LAW OF AGENCY ITS HISTORY AND PRESENT 
PRINCIPLES 209, 243 (1961). 
 114. There may have been a rebuttable presumption against the commission 
agent having any ability to create contractual privity. Ireland v. Livingstone 
[1871–72] SCLR 5 (HL) 395; Armstrong v. Stokes [1872] SCLR 7 (QB) 598. 
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him, the factor acting in his own name. For the buyer, this posed less risk 
than contracting with an unknown foreign seller. The local factor’s 
reputation is known and can be relied upon. Factor and buyer might be 
linked in social, ethnic, or religious networks.115 In fact, English law 
applied a “strong presumption of fact”—known as the “foreign principal 
rule”—that only the factor and the buyer would be contractually bound.116 
If a principal resided abroad, the principal could neither sue nor be sued 
on contracts concluded by his English agent.117 In other words, the agent 
alone was liable to the third party. The foreign principal was assumed not 
to have authorized or intended his English agent to create contractual 
privity with a third party in England.118 This presumption applied whether 
the principal was disclosed or undisclosed. As a presumption, it could be 
rebutted by clear evidence that there was no intention that the agent be 
personally liable.119 The presumption therefore “only applied in cases 
where the parties’ intentions were open to doubt.”120 A presumption to this 
effect is no longer part of English law.121 The activities of factors were not 
limited to foreign trade but additionally extended to domestic sales. 
To understand the reasons why a factor would fail to disclose the 
existence of a principal, consider the model of the contract of sale in use 
at this time. It was an executed rather than an executory contract. Given 
that the factor both delivered the goods to the third-party purchaser and 
collected the purchase price from him, it was largely irrelevant to both 
parties whether the factor named his principal or not.122 
                                                                                                             
 115. This theme is explored by BORIS KOZOLCHYK, COMPARATIVE 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS: LAW, CULTURE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 783–
809 (2014). 
 116. WATTS & REYNOLDS, supra note 5, ¶ 9-020.  
 117. Elbinger A G v. Claye [1873] SCLR 8 (QB) 313. WATTS & REYNOLDS, 
supra note 5, ¶ 8-007; STOLJAR, supra note 113, at 238–39.  
 118. Elbinger A G v. Claye [1873] SCLR 8 (QB) 313, per Blackburn, J at 317. 
WATTS & REYNOLDS, supra note 5, ¶ 8-070; MUNDAY, supra note 5, ¶ 12.18. 
 119. WATTS & REYNOLDS, supra note 5, ¶ 8-020; MUNDAY, supra note 5, ¶ 
12.19.  
 120. MUNDAY, supra note 5, ¶ 12.19. 
 121. Teheran-Europe Co. Ltd. v. S.T. Belton (Tractors) Ltd. [1968] (QB) 545. 
Nevertheless, 20th century English cases indicate that the fact that a principal is 
foreign may be at least one factor in deciding who the parties intended to be bound 
in the contract: Miller Gibb & Co. v. Smith & Tyrer Ltd. [1917] 2 (KB) 141; 
Teheran-Europe Co. v. S T Belton (Tractors) Ltd. [1968] (QB) 545, per Diplock 
J at 559. In a modern context, banker’s commercial credits perform the same 
function, providing buyers in international sale of goods contracts with 
reassurance that the price will be paid.  
 122. STOLJAR, supra note 113, at 205.  
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B. Expansion and Further Development: Undisclosed Agency 
Although views differ on which reported case marks the first 
recognition of undisclosed agency in English law,123 the legal concept 
seems to have developed in England in cases during the 18th century.124 
Samuel Stoljar dates it to the turn of the 18th century.125 He emphasizes as 
important developments the increase in the volume and speed of trade 
carried out by factors and the fact that factors had begun to sell on credit.126 
These developments increased the risks for principals. Undisclosed 
agency allowed a principal, fearing that his agent was about to go 
bankrupt, to intervene in the agent’s contract with the third party to raise 
an action directly against the third party for the price, or the return of the 
principal’s goods. This is notwithstanding the fact that the undisclosed 
principal is not a party to that contract. Over time, its use extended beyond 
the limited context of bankruptcy. In the modern law, the principal can 
intervene at any time, at his option.127 
So far, the explanation has focused on the principal’s ability to emerge 
in order to sue the third party directly. The third party’s concomitant right 
to sue the principal emerged later. Whilst Samuel Stoljar suggested that it 
“appears fully established” in the 18th century,128 Gerald Fridman is more 
cautious, stating that it was “mooted in the latter part of the eighteenth 
century, and firmly established in the early nineteenth.”129 A third party 
would, of course, have to know of the existence of a principal in order to 
                                                                                                             
 123. Ames, for example, suggests Scrimshire v Alderton (1743) 2 Strange 
1182 (Undisclosed Principal – his rights and liabilities, 18 YALE L.J. 443, 446 
(1909)). In that case, the jury did not allow the undisclosed principal to sue the 
third party, despite being directed by Lee LJ to do so. Krebs doubts whether this 
is a true case of undisclosed agency. See Krebs, supra note 10, at 164.  
 124. STOLJAR, supra note 113, at 204. According to Müller-Freienfels, there 
“is no clear reported case of an undisclosed principal before the eighteenth 
century.” W. Müller-Freienfels, The Undisclosed Principal, 16 MOD. L. REV. 299, 
302 (1953). 
 125. STOLJAR, supra note 113, at 205–06. Stoljar identifies the following cases 
as the earliest instances of intervention by undisclosed principals: Burdett v Willett 
(1708) 2 Vern 638; L’Apostre v Le Plaistrier (1708) 1 P. Wms. 314, 318; 
Copeman v Gallant (1716) 1 P. Wms. 314; Godfrey v Furzo (1733) 3 P. Wms. 
185; Whitecomb v Jacob (1709) 1 Salk. 160. Id. at 206 n.18 
 126. See supra note 113. 
 127. WATTS & REYNOLDS, supra note 5, ¶ 8-071. 
 128. STOLJAR, supra note 113, at 210.  
 129. Fridman, supra note 111, ¶ 5.03 (citing, from the early 19th century, 
Thomson v. Davenport [1829] 9 B & C 78; Cothay v. Fennell 109 ER 599; [1830] 
10 B & C 671). 
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sue him. The principal is unlikely to emerge unless it is in her interests to 
do so. For this reason, perhaps, there are fewer examples in reported cases 
of litigation initiated by third parties. The third party tends to raise a claim 
as a response to a claim raised against him by the principal. 
C. Unidentified Agency 
If the agent makes clear her status as agent but does not name her 
principal, the law classifies this as “unidentified” rather than undisclosed 
agency. In undisclosed agency, the third party has no idea that there is a 
principal; in unidentified agency, the third party knows that there is a 
principal but does not know who that principal is. Although English courts 
have not always clearly separated undisclosed from unidentified agency, 
they are distinct ideas with distinct rules.130 If the agent acts for an 
unidentified principal, English law treats the situation as a type of 
disclosed agency and, as such, follows the normal rules of disclosed 
agency.131 The agent creates a direct contract between the principal and 
third party. This scenario can be contrasted with undisclosed agency, 
where the agent creates a contract which binds him personally to the third 
party, although the principal can later step in to that contract in order to 
sue the third party. The English approach to unidentified agency follows a 
certain logic: the third party is aware that there is a principal and is 
presumably happy to form a contract with that principal, whomever she 
may be. This is in distinct contrast to undisclosed agency, in which the 
third party is completely unaware that a principal exists. 
V. UNDISCLOSED AND UNIDENTIFIED AGENCY IN THE UNITED STATES 
This Part identifies the first appearance of undisclosed agency in major 
United States treatises on the law of agency. The aim is to provide a 
backdrop for consideration of the development of undisclosed agency in 
Louisiana law. Williams v. Winchester,132 discussed below, decided in 
1828, is usually identified as the first Louisiana case to recognize 
undisclosed agency. There are no direct references in the report of that 
case to the law in other states. This Part aims to identify what, in terms of 
contemporary United States agency scholarship, was available to the 
Louisiana judges deciding the first Louisiana undisclosed agency case. 
                                                                                                             
 130. Francis M.B. Reynolds, Unidentified Principals in the Common Law, in 
AGENCY LAW AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICE ¶ 4.02 (Danny Busch, Laura 
Macgregor & Peter Watts eds., 2016).  
 131. WATTS & REYNOLDS, supra note 5, ¶ 1-037.  
 132. Williams v. Winchester, 7 Mart. (n.s.) 22 (La. 1828). 
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The factor was significant not only in English trade, but also in trade in 
the United States. Roderick Munday suggested that, by the 18th century, 
factors were established along the eastern seaboard,133 and indeed played a 
“vital financial function” in the United States generally.134 If one considers 
the economic benefits factors offered, it is easy to understand why they 
played such a vital function in the United States at the time. For buyers or 
sellers of goods located in the United States, the factor acted as a local 
trusted contracting party. Just as in England, so too in the United States, 
contracting with a factor would have involved less risk than contracting with 
an unknown foreign party. Munday explained the high dependence of 
manufacturers on factors by reference to the “great distances separating the 
seller and the buyer both within and without the United States,” and the 
slowness of communications.135 
The major United States treatises on agency appeared during the 19th 
century. Story’s Commentaries on the law of agency appeared in first 
edition in 1839,136 and Mechem’s Treatise on the law of agency appeared 
in 1889.137 Story in his discussion of undisclosed agency refers to English 
treatises—Paley, Chitty, Smith138—but also to one U.S. treatise, written 
by Samuel Livermore in 1818.139 Livermore’s work contains a discussion 
of undisclosed agency, written in basic terms, referring to one of the 
earliest English cases, Scrimshire v Alderton.140 
The history of undisclosed agency in English law is bound up with the 
history of factors acting for foreign principals. Factors were presumed not 
to form direct contracts between their principal and a third party resident 
abroad. The development of undisclosed agency allowed the principal to 
                                                                                                             
 133. Munday, supra note 14, at 251.  
 134. Id. at 260. 
 135. Id. at 251.  
 136. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AS A BRANCH 
OF MERCANTILE JURISPRUDENCE WITH OCCASIONAL ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE 
CIVIL AND FOREIGN LAW (1851). 
 137. FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY: INCLUDING 
NOT ONLY A DISCUSSION OF THE GENERAL SUBJECT, BUT ALSO SPECIAL CHAPTERS 
ON ATTORNEYS, AUCTIONEERS, BROKERS AND FACTORS (1st ed. 1889).  
 138. STORY’S COMMENTARIES § 266 (1839). The editions referred to are likely 
to be: WILLIAM PALEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 
CHIEFLY WITH REFERENCE TO MERCANTILE TRANSACTIONS (John H. Lloyd ed., 3d. 
ed. 1833); JOSEPH CHITTY, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS OF COMMERCE AND 
MANUFACTURES (1824); JOHN W. SMITH, A COMPENDIUM OF MERCANTILE LAW 
(2d. ed. 1838). 
 139. SAMUEL LIVERMORE, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 
(2d ed. 1818). 
 140. Id. at 281–82 (referring to Scrimshire v. Alderton [1743] 2 Strange 1182). 
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intervene on those contracts. The early United States treatises analyze the 
foreign principal rule. Story’s first edition notes the presumption that 
credit is given to the factor and that the factor is dealt with as a principal.141 
It contains, however, only isolated references to, rather than a 
comprehensive treatment of, undisclosed principals.142 He cited both 
English treatises and case law.143 By the time of Mechem’s first edition in 
1889, the concept appears to have developed significantly. He analyzed 
the law relating to factors in a specific chapter,144 noting the factor’s ability 
to sell in his own name.145 The treatise fully analyzed the fundamental 
characteristics of undisclosed agency, both from the perspective of the 
agent146 and of the principal.147 
Of all the U.S. treatises on agency, only Livermore’s would have been 
available to the Louisiana Supreme Court deciding Williams v. 
Winchester.148 Livermore’s treatise appeared in two editions, the second 
published in Baltimore in 1818. He was, however, living in New Orleans 
at that time: a search of Martin’s reports reveals his appearance as an 
attorney in cases going as far back as 1819.149 Looking at contemporary 
developments in the United States beyond simply agency treatises, the 
existence of codes enacted by the southern states is potentially relevant. 
Leaving aside the Louisiana Code, considered below, the California Code 
is drafted in language which accommodates undisclosed agency.150 It is, 
however, much later in date, becoming effective in 1873.151 It can be 
concluded that undisclosed agency emerged in Louisiana law at an early 
stage, considered against the backdrop of legal developments in agency 
law in the United States during the 19th century. 
                                                                                                             
 141. STORY, supra note 136, § 290. 
 142. Id. § 396. 
 143. Id. §§ 393, 396 n.1 (citing CHITTY, TREATISE ON THE LAWS OF 
COMMERCE AND MANUFACTURES; PALEY, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRINCIPAL 
AND AGENT; and two cases: Leeds v. the Marine Insur Com, 6 Wheat 565 and 
Sims v. Bond, 3 Barn & Adolph 393). 
 144. MECHEM, supra note 137, at Book V, Chap. IV, “Of factors.”  
 145. Id. § 991. 
 146. Id. §§ 554–55. 
 147. Id. §§ 696–702. 
 148. Williams v. Winchester, 7 Mart. (n.s.) 22 (La. 1828). 
 149. He continued to live in New Orleans until his death in 1833. 
 150. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2330 (2019). Undisclosed agency is not, it seems, 
antagonistic to Codes. The author is grateful to Professor Deborah DeMott for 
drawing her attention to this example. 
 151. Id. 
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VI. UNDISCLOSED AND UNIDENTIFIED AGENCY IN LOUISIANA LAW 
This Part explores the development of undisclosed and unidentified 
agency in Louisiana law, drawing both on the Digest or Code of 1808 and 
on developments taking place in case law. It ends with consideration of 
Revision of Title XV of the Code, Representation and Mandate, in 1997.  
A. The Louisiana Digest or Civil Code of 1808 
Before considering the relevant provisions of the Louisiana Digest of 
1808, it is helpful to describe the contract of mandate in Roman law, from 
which both Louisiana and Scots law ultimately derive. In Roman law, 
mandate was a gratuitous contract entered into between friends and social 
equals.152 Roman law did not recognize direct representation, that is the 
ability of the mandatar or agent to form contracts directly between his 
mandant or principal and third parties. Whilst this has led some to describe 
mandate in Roman law as a “very imperfect form of agency,”153 others have 
noted that different concepts were used as functional equivalents of agency, 
rendering the development of direct representation unnecessary.154 
The English translation of the Digest of 1808 states, under the heading, 
“Of Mandate or Commission,” “[a] procuration or letter of attorney is an 
act by which one person gives power to another to transact for him one of 
several affairs.”155 This appears to omit a requirement to act in the name 
of a principal, a key requirement in the civil law. There appears, however, 
to have been an error in translation. The French authoritative156 version 
states: “Le mandat ou procuration, est un acte par lequel quelqu’un donne 
pouvoir à un autre, de faire pour lui et en son nom, une ou plusieurs 
affaires.”157 The omission from the English translation of the crucial 
words, “in the name of,” has not, as far as the author is aware, been 
                                                                                                             
 152. REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 424 (1996). 
 153. Raphael Powell, Contractual Agency in Roman Law and English Law, S. 
AFR. L. REV. 41, 42 (1956). 
 154. WILLIAM M. GORDON, ROMAN LAW, SCOTS LAW AND LEGAL HISTORY 
54 (2007), first published in 3 STUDI IN ONORE DI C SANFILIPO 345 (1983). 
 155. Id. tit. XIII, ch. 1, art. 1. 
 156. “[T]he English version was merely a translation from the French 
original.” A.N. Yiannopoulos, The Civil Codes of Louisiana, 1 CIV. L. 
COMMENTARIES 7 (2008). 
 157. Id. (emphasis added). It is suggested that the correct English translation 
would be: “[a] procuration or letter of attorney is an act by which one person gives 
power to another to transact for him and in his name one of several affairs.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
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discussed in Louisiana scholarship. Did the translator omit these crucial 
words because he was more in tune with the common law, translating what 
he expected to read? The English translation was corrected in the Code of 
1825, the words, “for him and in his name” appearing for the first time.158 
Acceptance by the other person perfected this act into a contract.159 These 
provisions are reflective of article 1984 of the French Code Napoléon, 
without being an exact copy.160 They appear to follow the wording of the 
Projet of 1800, which preceded enactment of the Code Napoléon, rather 
than the Code itself. 
A relevant French concept is not present in the Digest of 1808: the 
French prête-nom. In French law, where the principal hides his existence, 
this is treated as part of the law of simulation—also known as contre-
lettre—and the third party is provided with a direct action against the 
principal, but not vice versa.161 The French prête-nom, which recognizes 
only one direct action, can be contrasted with undisclosed agency in the 
common law, the latter allowing the principal to sue the third party and 
the third party to sue the principal. The lack of the prête-nom left 
something of a lacuna in Louisiana law. 
The specifically contractual nature of mandate did not change on 
further revision of the Code in 1870.162 This contractual nature is 
                                                                                                             
 158. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2954 (1825): “A procuration or letter of attorney is an 
act by which one person gives power to another to transact for him and in his 
name, one of several affairs.” 
 159. LA. CIV. CODE tit. XIII, ch. 1, art. 2 (1808). 
 160. John D. Wogan, Agency Power in Louisiana, 40 TUL. L. REV. 110, 112 
(1965); Thomas P. LeBlanc, Woodlawn Park Ltd. v. Doster Construction 
Company, Inc.: Disclosing Undisclosed Agency Law in Louisiana, 54 LA. L. REV. 
1395, 1401 (1994); North, supra note 43, at 290. 
 161. In the modern law, the prête-nom is treated as being contractually bound 
to the third party (Cass Com 26/04/1982, D 1986, 233) even if the third party 
knew that the prête-nom was in fact a prête-nom—i.e., was an artifice—unless he 
himself knew about the simulation and was party to it (Civ 3eme, 8 July 1992, 
JCP 1993, II 21982). See also the contre-lettre, CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1201 
(Fr.): “Where the parties have concluded an apparent contract which conceals a 
secret contract, the latter (also called a ‘counter-letter’) takes effect between the 
parties. It cannot be set up against third parties, though the latter may rely on it.” 
See also C. CIV. art. 1202. 
 162. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2988 (1870); LA. CIV. CODE art. 2989 (1997): “A 
mandate is a contract by which a person, the principal, confers authority on 
another person, the mandatary, to transact one or more affairs for the principal.” 
1997 La. Acts 412.  
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something which Louisiana law shares with Scots law and can be 
contrasted with the common law tradition.163  
The mandate provisions of the Digest of 1808 assume a gratuitous, 
rather than a non-gratuitous, relationship, although the parties could agree 
otherwise.164 Boris Kozolchyk described the legal tradition within which 
Louisiana law can be placed at this time: 
[T]he drafters of the nineteenth century French and Spanish Civil 
Codes were not fully convinced of the benefits of 
commercialization and thus retained the Roman characterization 
of the contract of agency (mandatum) as gratuitous service to 
another, regardless of how necessary such intermediary services 
were in business transactions.165 
The Digest of 1808 also failed to focus on the ability of the person 
empowered to act on behalf of the principal to create contracts for that 
principal. This is not surprising given that the mandate provisions are 
based on article 1984 of the French Code Civil, which also failed to make 
clear the relationship between mandate, on the one hand, and 
representation on the other.166 Kozolchyk described civilian mandate as 
“impracticable”167 for modern business. Similarly, Jana Grauberger, 
speaking of the mandate provisions of the early Louisiana Civil Code, 
described them as “inadequate to handle many everyday problems.”168 
Only on revision in 1997 was a concept termed “representation” 
introduced into the Civil Code.169 This late appearance of representation is 
misleading, however. According to Holmes and Symeonides, the revision 
simply renamed a concept that “has always existed.”170 This theme—
failure of black letter law to reflect the law in practice—reappears below. 
The following Parts probe the possibility that not only representation, but 
also a form of undisclosed agency, may have existed in Louisiana law 
despite its absence from the Civil Code before 1997. 
                                                                                                             
 163. See infra Part VII.A. 
 164. LA. CIV. CODE tit. XIII, ch. 1, art. 5 (1808).  
 165. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 115, at 95. 
 166. Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos, Brokerage, Mandate and Agency in 
Louisiana Law: Civilian Tradition and Modern Practice, 19 LA. L. REV. 777, 
782–85 (1959). 
 167. KOZOLCHYK, supra note 115, at 425. 
 168. Jana L. Grauberger, From Mere Intrusion to General Confusion: Agency 
and Mandate in Louisiana, 72 TUL. L. REV. 257, 266 (1997). 
 169. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2985 (2019). 
 170. Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 44, at 1091. 
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B. Trading Conditions in the 19th Century 
Even before the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, a large volume of 
American trade flowed through Louisiana.171 Because Louisiana had been 
underpopulated, the Spanish government had encouraged Americans to 
settle there, so much so that Americans came to “dominate economic life” 
there.172 After the Louisiana Purchase, this trade increased.173 It is likely 
that traders from other states, whether seeking to trade in Louisiana 
temporarily or to relocate there permanently, would begin to apply 
methods of trading with which they were familiar, undisclosed agency 
potentially being one of them. 
Richard Kilbourne’s work on the role of the factor illustrates how 
crucial that economic actor was to the Louisiana economy in the 19th 
century. He stated: “[T]he exclusive form of business was factorage.”174 
The factor often chose the business vehicle of commercial partnership in 
order to trade.175 It was common to transact business not in the name of 
the principal, but rather in the name of the factor, or trading house.176 The 
importance of the factor can be explained, at least in part, by the factor’s 
role as a lender. Factors provided private investment banking facilities in 
Louisiana at this time, facilitating the smooth operation of the economy.177 
Wealthy clients banked with factors because of the higher rates of interest 
they offered in comparison to banks, and made large deposits with their 
factors; these sums were then available for more general lending.178 Those 
clients, the principals, often did not reside in Louisiana, a fact ascribed to 
the “insalubrity of the climate.”179 The finance factors provided was both 
short-term and long-term on unsecured commercial paper.180 Long-term 
finance was important if one takes into account the highly seasonal nature 
of the trade in Louisiana, resting mainly on production of cotton. Factors 
                                                                                                             
 171. JOHN W. CAIRNS, CODIFICATION, TRANSPLANTS AND HISTORY LAW 
REFORM IN LOUISIANA (1808) AND QUEBEC (1866) 21 (2015). 
 172. Id. 
 173. John T. Hood, Jr., The History and Development of the Louisiana Civil 
Code, 19 LA. L. REV. 18 (1958). 
 174. KILBOURNE, JR., supra note 55, at 108–09.  
 175. Id. at 115. 
 176. Id. at 65 (citing Ward v. Brandt, 11 Mart. (o.s.) 331 (La. 1822)). 
 177. RICHARD H. KILBOURNE, JR., The Emergence of Factors as Investment 
Bankers, in DEBT, INVESTMENT, SLAVES CREDIT RELATIONS IN EAST FELICIANA 
PARISH, LOUISIANA 1825-1885 26 (1995). 
 178. Id. at 42, 45. 
 179. KILBOURNE, JR., supra note 55, at 109 (quoting Ward v. Brandt, 11 Mart. 
(o.s.) 331 (La. 1822)). 
 180. KILBOURNE, JR., supra note 177, at 4. 
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provided many services for clients, including the sourcing of loan facilities 
offered by third parties. They were often integral in the purchase and sale 
of slaves.181 After the civil war, slave emancipation played a major part in 
the collapse of this part of the economy; 90% of the factorage firms failed, 
either during the war or within the succeeding decade.182 
Richard Kilbourne’s work presents a picture of a highly sophisticated 
economy. Factors were operating much like a modern private investment 
bank. This casts an intriguing light on the “impracticable” mandate 
provisions of the Digest of 1808: they seem inadequate to support factors’ 
activities. This raises the possibility that undisclosed agency might have 
been present in Louisiana at this time, even if not referred to in the Civil 
Code. As factors became lenders, the risk of their bankruptcy increased. 
Undisclosed agency would have provided principals with important 
protections from a factor’s bankruptcy. 
Social conditions existing in New Orleans at this time may have 
encouraged individuals to use agents to conceal their identities. Powell 
suggested that smuggling was a way of life in New Orleans in the 18th 
century, stating “[a]ll the town’s pillars of respectability” joined in the 
contraband trade.183 He continued: “Intermediaries, often widows, sisters, 
wives, or daughters, masked the retail side of trade by handling the 
smuggled merchandise on consignment. To get around the ban against 
nobles’ engaging in merchandising, les grands hired les petits to handle 
the consignment in their stead.”184 
Thus, individuals may have concealed their identities in order to trade, 
even if that trade was part of an illegal enterprise. In legitimate contracting 
too, concealing identity may have been a necessity for certain parts of the 
population. Powell suggests that women, generally active in trade, 
concealed their identity through the use of intermediaries.185 Slaves and free 
persons of color were also, as a general rule, active traders. Whilst free 
persons of color had no restrictions on their capacity to contract,186 slaves 
did. These sections of the population may have made use of factors to 
conceal their identities in order to trade. According to Powell, the people of 
                                                                                                             
 181. Id. at 39. 
 182. Id. at 7. 
 183. LAWRENCE N. POWELL, THE ACCIDENTAL CITY: IMPROVISING NEW 
ORLEANS 104 (2012). 
 184. Id. at 104. 
 185. Id. at 111. 
 186. GEORGE DARGO, JEFFERSON’S LOUISIANA POLITICS AND THE CLASH OF 
LEGAL TRADITIONS 11 (rev. ed. 2009). 
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New Orleans “were reinventing themselves with the ease of chameleons, 
overturning hierarchies fixed by custom, law, and providence.”187 
Trading in this way did not necessarily involve a greater degree of risk 
for the third party; the third party can benefit from undisclosed agency: 
she finds that she has an alternative debtor to the agent. If factors in 
Louisiana at this time were so financially dominant, third parties would 
not be concerned about the existence of an undisclosed principal. The 
agent has a good financial reputation, and, if there is an undisclosed 
principal, this means that the third party has the protection of an extra 
possible debtor. 
These ideas are put forward as suggestions only. The author has been 
unable to find hard evidence that undisclosed agency was taking place in 
Louisiana at this time. It has already been concluded, against the backdrop 
of the U.S. Treatises on Agency, that undisclosed agency emerged in the 
Louisiana courts at an early stage. It seems highly likely that the concept 
existed in practice before precedents from the common law became 
available to the Louisiana courts. 
C. Case Law: The Swing of the Pendulum Between the Civil and the 
Common Law 
This Part examines Louisiana cases in which a reception of common 
law undisclosed agency takes place. As suggested above, undisclosed 
agency probably existed in practice before the Louisiana Supreme Court 
recognized in 1828 in Williams v. Winchester.188 Thus, the reception 
discussed here is the adoption of common law precedents to rename a 
concept that was probably already in existence.189 
In Williams v. Winchester, the court held that a third party could hold 
a principal, once disclosed, liable for the price of goods sold to an agent. 
The Supreme Court appears not to have relied on the Civil Code provisions 
on mandate, nor on any civilian source. Instead, the court used common 
                                                                                                             
 187. POWELL, supra note 183, at 121.  
 188. Williams v. Winchester, 7 Mart. (n.s.) 22 (La. 1828). 
 189. This phenomenon is recognized by Alan Watson: “[J]urists at times 
exaggerate the extent of a transplant. Often the host system had a similar rule and 
little of importance was received apart from terminology.” WATSON, supra note 
15, at 97. 
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law terminology,190 English cases,191 and Livermore’s Treatise.192 The fact 
that Livermore was a resident of New Orleans at this time was noted 
above.193 The Supreme Court cited his treatise in other agency cases.194 
His works, those of a local author who was also appearing in the Louisiana 
courts at the time, are likely to have been an attractive resource for the 
court. 
Despite this case being generally recognized as the first on undisclosed 
agency, it seems to involve unidentified agency. The third party was aware 
that a principal existed but did not know who that principal was. In 
undisclosed agency, both the fact of agency and the identity of the 
principal are unknown to the third party. According to the case report, the 
agents in question stated in a letter: “A friend of ours, a sugar planter, 
wishes to procure from your city a set of sugar kettles.”195 The existence 
of a principal is thus made clear to the third party. Confusion between 
undisclosed and unidentified agency is relatively common in other legal 
systems.196 Subsequent courts “fell into line” with this decision.197 Later 
cases developed the concomitant right of the undisclosed principal to sue 
the third party.198 
After Williams v. Winchester, the law as applied in the Louisiana 
courts became inconsistent with the Civil Code. Litigants sought to 
challenge the validity of the concept, most notably in 1947 in the Supreme 
Court case, Sentell v. Richardson.199 Chief Justice O’Neill stated: 
Our opinion is that the words “and in his name” are not essential 
                                                                                                             
 190. Fred W. Jones, Juridical Basis of Principal-Third Party Liability in 
Louisiana Undisclosed Agency Cases, 8 LA. L. REV. 409, 412 (1948). 
 191. 1 Campbell, NP 85; 4 Taunton 576, n.15 East, 65; SAMUEL LIVERMORE, 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT 199, 200 (2d ed. 1818). 
 192. LIVERMORE, supra note 191, at 199–200.  
 193. See infra Part V. 
 194. Ward v. Brandt, 11 Mart. (o.s.) 331 (La. 1822); McNeil v. Coleman, 8 
Mart. (o.s.) 373 (La. 1820). 
 195. Williams v. Winchester, 7 Mart. (n.s.) 22, 24 (La. 1828). 
 196. MUNDAY, supra note 5, ¶ 10.30–10.31. 
 197. North, supra note 43, at 295. Carlisle v. Steamer Eudora & Owners, 5 La. 
Ann. 15 (1850); Ballister v. Hamilton, 3 La. Ann. 401 (1848); Valmont Serv. 
Station v. Avegno, 3 La. App. 335 (Orl. 1925); Johnston v. Bisso Tow-Boat Co., 
1 Pelt. 75 (La. Ct. App. 1918); Grimaldi & Co. v. Sbisa, 10 Teiss. 176 (La. Ct. 
App. 1913).  
 198. De Soto Building Co. Ltd. v. Kohnstamm Orleans, 3 Pelt. 54, 62 (La. Ct. 
App. 1919); Childers v. Police Jury of Par. of Ouachita, 121 So. 248 (La. Ct. App. 
1928). 
 199. Sentell v. Richardson, 29 So. 2d 852 (La. 1947). 
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to the definition of a procuration or power of attorney, as defined 
in article 2985 of the Civil Code. If those words were essential to 
the definition there could be no such thing as a procuration or 
power of attorney to buy property for an undisclosed principal.200 
The Chief Justice appears to reason from the practical existence of the 
concept that it must be legally valid. The existence, in fact, led him to 
conclude that the words “in the name of” in the Civil Code were not 
essential. The court struggles with competing policies: commercial 
expediency—undisclosed agency, against formal transparency—and 
disclosed agency. Sentell has been described as a “ringing reaffirmation of 
undisclosed agency theory as a basic principle of Louisiana agency 
law,”201 and as amounting to judicial amendment of the Code.202 
A further challenge to the concept took place in 1983 in Teachers’ 
Retirement System v. Louisiana State Employees Retirement System.203 
The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal sought to return Louisiana 
agency law to the civilian approach, holding that the undisclosed principal 
had no right to sue a party with whom his agent had transacted. Referring 
to the Civil Code provisions on mandate,204 the Court quite accurately 
stated: “Nowhere in these articles do we find authority for an undisclosed 
principal suing a third person on a contract made by an agent. In fact, 
‘undisclosed agency’ is not recognized at all by the code.”205 
Referring to Planiol’s Civil Law Treatise,206 the court noted the 
distinction in French law between mandate, on the one hand, and prête-
nom or commission, on the other. The court concluded: “[U]nder the civil 
law tradition, Great American (the agent) was a ‘prête-nom’ who acted in 
its own behalf as opposed to representing itself to be acting for the other 
principals. As such, only Great American has a right of action against West 
Side.”207 
                                                                                                             
 200. Id. at 855 (emphasis added). 
 201. Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 44, at 1140.  
 202. Robert A. Pascal, Civil Code and Related Subjects, Agency. The Work of 
the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1946-1947 Term, 8 LA. L. REV. 223, 224 
(1948); North, supra note 43, at 296.  
 203. Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. La. State Emps. Ret. Sys., 444 So. 2d 193 (La. Ct. 
App. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 456 So. 2d 594 (La. 1984). 
 204. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2985–3034 (2019). 
  205.  Teachers’ Retirement, 444 So. 2d at 196. 
 206. MARCEL PLANIOL, TRAITÉ ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL, pt. 2, no. 
2271, 303 (11th & 12th eds. 1938 & 1939) (La. State Law Inst. trans., 1959). 
 207. Teachers’ Retirement, 444 So. 2d at 196–97. 
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The court classified Louisiana law as part of the civil law tradition, 
and thereby refused the undisclosed principal an action. This approach is 
questionable: the French prête-nom was not adopted into the Louisiana 
Civil Code. Previous Louisiana case law on undisclosed agency was 
dismissed as “older appellate decisions.” Judging from the case report, 
there appears to have been no reference to Sentell. On appeal, the Supreme 
Court reversed the decision on procedural grounds and the undisclosed 
principal point was not reconsidered. Less than a year later, the First 
Circuit recognized the right of a third party to sue an undisclosed 
principal.208 Although the court in the case in question discussed neither 
Sentell nor Teachers’, the terminology of undisclosed agency—
“undisclosed agent” and “undisclosed principal”—was used by the court.  
The desire to return Louisiana law to its civilian roots had not entirely 
disappeared, however. The First Circuit denied the undisclosed principal 
the right to sue once more in Woodlawn Park Ltd. Partnership v. Doster 
Construction Co., in 1992.209 The decision was overturned on appeal to 
the Supreme Court, Justice Lemmon stating: 
The Civil Code has never fully developed the concept of agency 
and representation with respect to the direct acquisition of rights 
and liabilities through the contractual action of a properly 
authorized intermediary who may or may not disclose his 
representative capacity. . . . However, Louisiana courts, perhaps 
recognizing that agency as a field of commercial law should be 
uniform throughout the country, have adopted notions of common 
law agency. . . . We restate approval of common law agency 
notions in commercial transactions. In matters of commercial law, 
Louisiana has frequently taken steps to make our law uniform with 
other states.210 
A significant issue for the court in Woodlawn was the fact that there 
would be no prejudice to the third party in allowing a direct action by the 
undisclosed principal. The third party was, after all, being called upon to 
perform the very contract into which he originally entered. The only 
difference to the third party is the change of party to whom he must 
perform. 
                                                                                                             
 208. Frank’s Door & Bldg. Supply Co. v. Double H Constr. Co., 459 So. 2d 
1273 (La. Ct. App. 1984). 
 209. Woodlawn Park Ltd. P’ship v. Doster Constr. Co., 602 So. 2d 1029 (La. 
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The Supreme Court characterized its method as developing an area in 
which the Civil Code was silent. Where a gap exists, recourse to the 
common law would be justifiable.211 The Civil Code was not, however, 
silent—it provided that the mandatary must act in the name of the 
principal. There is no ambiguity in that article. Rather than a gap, the more 
logical conclusion is that the situation is not mandate, the agent having 
failed to act in the name of the principal, and that no direct action could 
therefore be possible. 
The practical effect of the Supreme Court’s approach has been broadly 
welcomed by Louisiana authors as,212 for example, a “step forward for 
Louisiana commercial law.”213 The judicial method used has, however, 
been universally criticized.214 Although the courts had overcome the 
unsatisfactory terms of the Civil Code, the need for revision of the Code 
was, by the late 20th century, pressing. 
D. Revision of the Code, 1997 
Revised article 2985 defines representation, as opposed to mandate, 
for the first time: “A person may represent another person in legal relations 
as provided by law or by juridical act. This is called representation.” A 
new definition of mandate appears in article 2989. Crucially, the 
requirement that the agent act in the name of the principal was removed. 
The new text reads: “A mandate is a contract by which a person, the 
principal, confers authority on another person, the mandatary, to transact 
one or more affairs for the principal.” 
After revision, the first overt references in the Civil Code to the 
concept of undisclosed and unidentified agency appear. Article 3017, 
entitled, “Undisclosed mandate,” states: “A mandatary who contracts in 
his own name without disclosing his status as a mandatary binds himself 
personally for performance of the contract.” The Revision Comments state 
that this new provision is based in part on article 3013 of the Louisiana 
Civil Code of 1870 and article 2157 of the Québec Civil Code.215 The 
reference to the Québec Civil Code is interesting; the Revision Committee 
chose to use undisclosed agency in another mixed legal system as 
inspiration. There is no reference to the common law. 
                                                                                                             
 211. PALMER, supra note 19, at 66–67. 
 212. Jones, supra note 190, at 414; LeBlanc, supra note 160, at 1405.  
 213. North, supra note 43, at 299.  
 214. Jones, supra note 190, at 410; Pascal, supra note 202, at 224; LeBlanc, 
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 215. The source is provided as Civil Code articles 3012–13 (1870); Civil Code 
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Article 3023, entitled, “Undisclosed mandate or principal; obligations 
of third person,” provides: 
A third person with whom a mandatary contracts without 
disclosing his status or the identity of the principal is bound to the 
principal for the performance of the contract unless the obligation 
is strictly personal or the right non-assignable. The third person 
may raise all defenses that may be asserted against the mandatary 
or the principal. 
The Revision Comments state that article 3023 is new. 
Through the combined operation of these articles, the third party 
appears to be bound to both principal and mandatary at the same time. This 
position can be contrasted with versions of the undisclosed principal found 
in English or Scots law. Undisclosed agency in these latter systems 
involves the formation of a direct contract between agent and third party, 
which the principal, at his option, can step into to raise an action against 
the third party. There is, however, only one contract; the only question is 
which of two possible parties—the principal or the agent—is bound to the 
third party in that contract. The liability of the principal and the agent is 
described, in Scots law, as “alternative.”216 
Unidentified agency describes the situation in which the agent 
discloses the fact that she is an agent but conceals the name of the 
principal. It can be contrasted with undisclosed agency, where the 
existence of the principal—and indeed the fact that the agent is an agent—
is concealed. In unidentified agency, the third party knows that there is a 
principal, but she does not know who that principal is. Unidentified agency 
is governed by new article 3018, entitled “Disclosed mandate; undisclosed 
principal,” which provides: “A mandatary who enters into a contract and 
discloses his status as a mandatary, though not his principal, binds himself 
personally for the performance of the contract. The mandatary ceases to 
be bound when the principal is disclosed.”217 The Revision Comments 
state that this provision is new, and no source is given. Article 3022, 
entitled “Disclosed mandate or principal, third person bound” provides: 
“A third person with whom a mandatary contracts in the name of the 
principal, or in his own name as mandatary, is bound to the principal for 
the performance of the contract.”218 
In unidentified agency, as was the case in undisclosed agency, the 
Civil Code appears to set up dual liability: the third party is bound to both 
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agent and principal. By contrast to undisclosed agency, however, in 
unidentified agency, the agent is given an escape route. Naming the 
principal absolves the agent of liability.  
The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal confirmed that the 
agent bears the burden of proving that she disclosed his agency status and 
the identity of the principal if she wants to avoid personal liability.219 
Express notice of the agent’s status and the principal’s identity is not 
required if the agent proves that the third party knew of sufficient evidence 
of the agency relationship so as to put her on notice of the agency 
relationship. The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal also considered 
the way in which the agent’s representative capacity can be disclosed, 
suggesting that disclosure need not be express, but rather that certain 
indicia of agency may be present and proved as an issue of fact.220 
Article 3018 is of particular interest because, as explored below, it is 
very similar to modern Scots law. It differs from the equivalent provision 
of the Restatement (Second) Agency, in force at the time of Revision of 
the Louisiana Code.221 Under the Restatement, the agent remains a co-
obligor even after the principal becomes disclosed, unless there is specific 
agreement to the contrary. Thus, Louisiana law is more favorable towards 
the agent than the Restatement, providing the agent with a route for 
“automatic absolution.”222 The Revision Comments do not suggest a 
source for article 3018. The current author has, however, had access to the 
Minutes of the Revision Committee.223 The Minutes disclose that a 
majority of the Committee favored a rule in terms of which the mandatary 
was not bound by the contract but warranted both his authority and the 
existence of his principal. The Reporter, Professor Yiannopoulos, 
considered this solution to be “harsh” and suggested two alternatives.224 
                                                                                                             
 219. Rodgers v. N. La. Amusement & Gaming, L.L.C., 56 So. 3d 289, 291 
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The first alternative was to absolve the mandatary on naming the principal, 
and this was adopted as the final text of article 3018.225 The second would 
have seen the mandatary liable only if he promised to name the principal 
and failed to do so. Clearly, the more lenient approach of Louisiana law 
exists thanks to the persuasive talents of Professor Yiannopoulos.  
Article 3018 is strikingly similar to two modern European codification 
initiatives: the Principles of European Contract Law (“PECL”);226 and the 
Draft Common Frame of Reference (“DCFR”).227 The general effect of the 
PECL and the DCFR is to place a duty on the agent to name the principal 
if asked, and to hold the agent liable to the third party if he fails to do so. 
Under the PECL, the agent who fails to reveal is bound by the contract. 
Under the DCFR, the agent who fails to do so is treated as having acted 
“in a personal capacity.” In both cases, the agent becomes a party to the 
contract and is under a duty to name the principal. Revision of these 
articles of the Louisiana Civil Code postdates the PECL but predates the 
DCFR. A document containing comparative material was placed before 
the Committee, in essence mandate provisions from Greece, Germany, 
Italy, and the Netherlands.228 Thus, article 3018 is inspired by the civil law 
and was formed under the hand of one of Louisiana’s greatest civilians, 
Professor Yiannopoulos. 
Louisiana law, the PECL, and the DCFR can be contrasted in this 
respect with English law. In that system, only the principal is bound, and 
there is nothing to prevent the principal and agent from keeping the 
principal unidentified for as long as they want: there is no duty to identify 
the principal. 
Holmes and Symeonides were critical of new article 3018: “This is a 
rather peculiar rule, one which differs both from the common law and the 
pre-Revision jurisprudence, and may represent one of the least successful 
choices made in the Revision.”229 
Holmes and Symeonides suggest that this approach tends to promote 
opportunistic behavior on the part of the agent. The agent may conclude a 
contract in a representative capacity, making that representative capacity 
clear, but having no clear view which principal will ultimately be the 
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 226. PECL (2000), art 3:203. 
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beneficiary of that contract. This undermines certainty and conflicts with 
the general rule in undisclosed agency that there must be an actual 
principal in place before the agent contracts with the third party. Reynolds 
has expressed similar concerns in relation to English law.230 Although 
there is no evidence in reported Louisiana cases of agents acting in an 
opportunistic way, this approach certainly opens the door to possible 
abuse. Holmes and Symeonides conclude that “uniqueness is not 
necessarily a vice; in this case, however, it may be of dubious merit.”231 
E. Conclusions 
The story of the development of undisclosed agency law in Louisiana 
law is a unique and surprising one. The inaccurate translation of the 
mandate provisions of the Digest of 1808 may have caused confusion. 
Even though this was removed on revision of the Code in 1825, the Civil 
Code contained a lacuna, having failed to adopt the French prête-nom. It 
seems highly likely that undisclosed agency was already in place in 
Louisiana before the Supreme Court decided Williams v. Winchester. It is 
probable that it developed as a response to the form of international trade 
taking place in the early 19th century—that is, the way in which factors 
traded and the foreign principal rule. Indeed, as factors became lenders, 
the risks for principals increased, and this may have made undisclosed 
agency a practical necessity. If this is correct, the Supreme Court in 
Williams v. Winchester merely recognized, or legitimized, a practice 
already in existence. The alternative—that the Court transplanted an 
unknown rule from English law into Louisiana law, which then opened the 
door to a completely new way of trading using agents—seems unlikely. 
When the opportunity was taken to clear up the rather messy legal 
landscape, the Revision Committee did not simply adopt United States 
law—represented by the Restatement (Second) Agency. Rather, in certain 
respects, a unique approach was adopted, inspired in part by the law of 
another mixed legal system: Québec. 
VII. UNDISCLOSED AND UNIDENTIFIED AGENCY IN SCOTS LAW 
Building on the historical exploration of Scots law presented above in 
Part III, this Part focuses specifically on the development of agency law in 
                                                                                                             
 230. Reynolds, supra note 17.  
 231. Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 44, at 1144. 
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Scotland, in both the works of the Scottish Institutional writers and in the 
case law.  
A. Mandate 
Like Louisiana, the early law in Scotland applied a type of mandate 
received from Roman law. Erskine defined it as essentially gratuitous, 
“that contract by which one thus employs his friend to manage his affairs, 
or any branch of them.”232 Stair’s analysis in Institutions, published in 
1681, draws extensively on Roman law, both the Digest and the Institutes, 
and on Scottish case law. He draws contrasts: Scots law recognizes direct 
representation,233 whereas Roman law did not. He also contrasts Scots law 
with the civil law regarding the Scots’ attitude to delegation,234 and in the 
diligence that the mandatar—or agent—must show in the performance of 
the mandant’s—or principal’s—affairs.235 The influence of Roman 
mandate continues to the present day in the treatment of agency in Scots 
law as a contract.236 This emphasis is shared with Louisiana law and can 
be contrasted with English law where agency, although likely to be 
constituted by contract, need not be.237 
B. The Role of the Factor and Early Scottish Case Law 
Factors played a significant role in early Scottish trade, having wide 
powers and being entrusted with the possession and apparent ownership 
of goods.238 At that time, in common with his English counterpart, the 
factor “usually sells in his own name, without disclosing that of his 
                                                                                                             
 232. ERSKINE, INSTITUTE OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND III,iii,31. 
 233. STAIR, INSTITUTIONS OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND I,12,7. 
 234. Id.  
 235. Id. at I,12,10. 
 236. Judicial statements confirming that agency is a contract in Scots law 
include: Graham & Co v. United Turkey Red Co. 1922 SC 533; Lothian v. Jenolite 
Ltd 1969 SC 111; Trans Barwil Agencies (UK) Ltd. v. John S Braid 1988 SC 222; 
Connolly v. Brown [2006] CSOH 35, 2007 SLT 778; Ben Cleuch Estates Ltd. v. 
Scottish Enterprise [2006] CSOH 35, [2008] CSIH 1, 2008 SC 252. 
 237. WATTS & REYNOLDS, supra note 5, ¶ 1-006. Similarly, the California 
Civil Code 1873 does not classify agency as a contract. The agency provisions are 
not within Part 2 of the Code on “Contracts.” They are in Title 9, within 
“Obligations.” The author is grateful to Deborah DeMott for drawing this to her 
attention. 
 238. 1 GEORGE J. BELL, COMMENTARIES 476 (5th ed. 1826); ROBERT BELL, 
BELL’S DICTIONARY AND DIGEST OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 449–51 (George 
Watson ed., 1890). 
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principal and has implied authority to do so.”239 The factor was “generally 
the correspondent of a foreign house, or of a merchant or manufacturer at 
a distance from the place of sale.”240 
Certain early Scottish cases appear to recognize the ability of an agent, 
acting in his own name, to acquire rights and duties for the principal which 
are directly enforceable against and by a third party. This is, in essence, a 
form of undisclosed agency. These cases occur from the late 17th and early 
18th centuries onwards, predating the Union with England. They suggest 
that Scottish commercial law was an autonomous system of law, not yet 
significantly influenced by English law. The set of reports in which the 
cases appear is a compilation made from earlier reports; the reports are 
brief, sometimes amounting to little more than a short paragraph.241 The 
factual circumstances of the transactions as described in these reports can 
be unclear. Nevertheless, the relevant case reports, discussed below, are 
not ambiguous and seem to confirm the existence of a native Scottish idea 
of undisclosed agency. 
The first relevant case, Sterly v. Spence, decided in 1687, takes place 
in the context of bankruptcy, the context in which English undisclosed 
agency was born.242 Although the parties to the action are not described as 
“agent” and “principal,” the facts involve the sale and purchase of goods 
in a representative capacity. The agent travelled to Holland to both sell and 
buy on behalf of a principal. The principal successfully claimed the goods 
in competition with the agent’s trustee in bankruptcy. A further example 
from the close of the 17th century is Street v. Hume and Bruntfield.243 A 
principal based in London sent skins for his Edinburgh factor to sell. The 
factor being “dead bankrupt,” the court held that the London principal had 
a direct action against the third party purchaser for declarator that the price 
of the goods was payable to the principal.244 Stair, discussing the case, 
                                                                                                             
 239. GEORGE J. BELL, supra note 238, at 477. 
 240. Id. 
 241. The set of reports is MORISON’S DICTIONARY, produced from 1801 
onwards, and available on HeinOnline, as part of the Scottish Legal History 
Collection, under “Other Works,” and alphabetized under “D” for “Decisions.” 
The author has been unable to trace Session Papers (i.e., full copies of the case 
papers) for the cases in question, apart from Milne v. Harris (1803) Mor 8,493 
(Scot.), Session Papers for which have been consulted.  
 242. Sterly v. Spence (1687) Mor 15,127 (Scot.). 
 243. Street v. Hume & Bruntfield (1669) Mor 15,122 (Scot.). 
 244. Although Stair, writing in 1681, and Erskine, writing in 1773, both note 
this case, it is not discussed by either of them in the context of undisclosed agency. 
The title “undisclosed agency” appears only in the 19th century in Scotland. See 
infra Part VII.C; STAIR, supra note 233, at 17; ERSKINE, supra note 232, at 34.  
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stated that the agent is not obliged to tell the third party that he is an 
agent.245 Rather, it is the duty of the third party to find out the identity of 
the party with whom he is contracting.246 Thus, Stair, the most important 
of the Scottish institutional writers, confirms the ability to act as an 
undisclosed agent. 
Moving to the 18th century, in Hay v. Hay,247 a hidden principal 
appears to have defeated the agent’s executor on the agent’s death. The 
case may, however, be an example of negotiorum gestio—unauthorized 
management of an absent principal’s estate.248  
In Milne v. Harris, decided in 1803, the court found a purchaser entitled 
to a direct action against a seller, acting through a traveling agent.249 
Although not an example of undisclosed agency, institutional writer Hume 
discusses this and the other cases before confirming the existence of 
undisclosed agency: 
[A] mandatary is free, by our practice, to deal in the name of his 
constituent equally as his own; and if he do so—nay, in some 
instances, though he have not done so, he binds his constituent 
and acquires and bestows a claim on him equally as if the bargain 
were made by him in person.250 
Scottish case law and institutional analysis predating the turn of the 19th 
century recognizes direct actions between third parties and undisclosed 
principals. If Müller-Freienfels is correct that, in English law, there “is no 
clear reported case of an undisclosed principal before the eighteenth 
century,”251 then the Scottish cases are at least contemporaneous with the 
development of the undisclosed principal in English law. It seems unlikely 
that Scottish courts, seeing an English innovation, sought to import it. 
Rather, it seems more likely that the Scottish courts were responding to 
existing trading conditions and fashioning a solution. They would draw on 
the commercial practice of factors to do so. Many of those factors will 
have traded across the English-Scottish border. There is similarity to the 
                                                                                                             
 245. STAIR, supra note 233, at 17 (relying on Howison v. Cockburn (1665) 
Mor 11,604 (Scot.)). 
 246. Id. Stair’s view on this point was affirmed by the Inner House in Wester 
Moffat Colliery Co. Ltd. v. A Jeffrey & Co. (1911) SC 346 (Scot.). 
 247. Hay v. Hay (1707) Mor 15,128 (Scot.). 
 248. The appellant bakers in the case certainly argued that the agent was a 
gestor. Id. 
 249. Milne v. Harris (1803) Mor 8,493 (Scot.). 
 250. BARON DAVID HUME’S LECTURES 1786-1822 160–61 (G.C.H. Paton ed., 
vol. 2, reprt. 1939–58) (emphasis added).  
 251. Müller-Freienfels, The Undisclosed Principal, supra note 41, at 302.  
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Louisiana experience in this respect. It is suggested that Scots law—and 
indeed Louisiana law—were responding to commercial pressures which 
arose from the nature of global trade, molding their laws in response. This 
situation in Scotland was temporary, however. Eventually, English 
precedents became available, and they were adopted in preference to the 
native Scottish legal concept, causing that native concept to virtually 
disappear. 
C. The 19th Century and the Influence of Bell 
The institutional writer George Joseph Bell played a crucial role in the 
development of modern commercial law in Scotland. He analyzes 
undisclosed agency in his book, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland and 
on the Principles of Mercantile Jurisprudence.252 He contrasted Scots law, 
which recognized non-gratuitous mandate, with the gratuitous mandate of 
Roman law, describing mandate in Scots law as “a more important and 
useful concept.”253 This book developed from a text focusing specifically 
on bankruptcy.254 This is, of course, the context in which undisclosed 
agency arose in English law. Bell confirms the principal’s right to claim 
his goods held by the factor on the factor’s bankruptcy. The case he 
discusses, although not named, is unmistakably Sterly v. Spence—the first 
case discussed in Part VII.B above.255 Referring to doubts on this point, he 
confirms that the principal can claim his goods even where the factor acted 
in his own name, provided that “the goods are fairly traceable to the 
commission given.”256 This last phrase is opaque, and the requirement 
imposed could have a number of meanings: that the goods are purchased 
by the factor within his authority, or the word ‘traceable’ may suggest that 
publicity of the fact of agency is required. Bell cites, and appears to follow, 
an English case: “I conceive the doctrine of the English law to be clear.”257 
He notes the practice of purchasing in the factor’s own name in Russia, 
and interestingly also in “the cotton trade on the coast of America,” where 
                                                                                                             
 252. BELL, supra note 61. Bell’s other famous work, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW 
OF SCOTLAND, does not refer to the undisclosed principal, although it notes the 
foreign principal rule, §§ 80–87 (citing Burgess v. Bink & Co., July 2 1829, 7 S 
D 824 (4th ed. 1839)). 
 253. BELL, supra note 61, vol. 2, at 193. 
 254. BELL, COMMENTARIES ON THE MUNICIPAL AND MERCANTILE LAW OF 
SCOTLAND CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO THE SUBJECT OF BANKRUPTCY,  vols. 1–
2, (1800–04). 
 255. Sterly v. Spence (1687) Mor 15,127 (Scot.). 
 256. BELL, supra note 61, vol. 2 at 196. 
 257. Id. (citing Ex Parte Chion. Trinity 1721, 3 Peere Williams, 187 n.). 
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the legal result is unchanged.258 Further editions of Commentaries 
published during Bell’s life continue to discuss undisclosed agency almost 
exclusively by reference to English authorities.259 
From this point onwards, the Scottish judiciary relied on Bell’s works, 
failing to cite earlier Scottish case law. Lord Justice-Clerk Boyle stated in 
1836: 
In a case such as this, I do not object to reference to the law of 
England, which rides over almost the whole of our mercantile law; 
but we have the law both of the English and Scotch cases on this 
point well expounded in Mr. Bell’s work, who has seized the 
principles which run through those cases.260 
As a comment on Bell’s work, this is not correct: he did not refer to 
the early Scottish case law. By relying exclusively on Bell, the court 
imported English law. The Scottish bar—Faculty of Advocates—in 
contrast, continued to cite Scottish cases, perhaps as a mark of its 
independence.261 The judiciary placed Scots law on an English course. The 
“war” was not entirely over, however. In 1860, a full bench decision of the 
Court of Session departed from Bell’s view,262 which reflected English law 
at the time, on the foreign principal rule.263 Progress continued towards 
assimilation with English undisclosed agency law. An Inner House case 
                                                                                                             
 258. Id. at 197. 
 259. BELL, supra note 61, vol. 1, at 399 (4th ed. 1821); BELL, supra note 61, 
vol. 2, at 323 (3rd ed. 1819). 
 260. Stevenson v. Campbell (1836) 14 S 562, 568 (Scot.) (the principal 
became disclosed during the course of dealing). See Carsewell v. Scotts (1839) 1 
D 1215 (Scot.) (a further case involving an undisclosed principal, decided by the 
Inner House during this period). 
 261. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Campbell (1836) 14 S 562 (Scot.). 
 262. BELL, supra note 61, vol. 1, at 536 supports his contrary view with the 
English case, De Gallion v. L’Aigle 1 Bos and Pull 368, and, R. POTHIER, 
CONTRAT DE MANDAT, No 87, Vol 11, 188. Kenneth Reid has noted Bell’s 
extensive use of Pothier’s works. Kenneth G.C. Reid, Introduction, in GEORGE J. 
BELL, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND xx–xxi (Kenneth G.C. Reid ed., 4th 
ed. 1839). 
 263. Millar v. Mitchell (1860) 22 D 833 (Scot.). The early Scottish authorities 
had been unclear. See Hunter v. Chalmers & Co. (1766) Mor 14,199; Brown v. 
McDougal, November 30, 1802; Burgess v. Bink and Co., July 2, 1829. Only in 
the final case is the agent not found liable. BELL, supra note 61, vol. 1, at 536 
supports his contrary view with the English case of De Gallion v. L’Aigle 1 Bos 
and Pull 368, and R. POTHIER, CONTRAT DE MANDAT, No 87, Vol 11, 188. 
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from 1881 provided a working definition; the case was decided almost 
exclusively by reference to an English case.264 Lord Young stated: 
[I]f a person really acting for another goes into the market and 
buys as if for himself, he binds himself, but if the party from whom 
he buys finds out his true position then he can treat him as an agent 
only. He cannot have two principals to deal with, and no double 
remedy is allowed.265 
As far as the author can determine, the first judicial usage of the phrase 
“undisclosed principal” in Scotland occurred in 1847.266 By 1899, the 
phrase became the heading of a new section appearing for the first time in 
a posthumously published edition of Bell’s Principles.267 The 19th century 
ended, as has already been noted, with the passing of statutes on 
commercial topics for the United Kingdom as a whole, including bills of 
exchange, partnership, sale of goods, marine insurance, and, factors, or 
mercantile agents.268 
D. Modern Scots Law 
English law remains the main point of reference in Scottish cases on 
undisclosed agency in the modern law. It is usual to cite English 
precedents: indeed, it would be unusual not to do so. Courts refer to the 
classic English texts, and the author’s Scottish text on agency law, 
published in 2013.269 
Differences between Scots and English law continue. In both Scots 
and English law, the third party, once aware of the existence of the 
principal, must elect to sue either the principal or the agent; she cannot sue 
both. Election, once made, is final.270 If she sues the agent and obtains a 
decree against that agent, but the agent has no funds, she cannot then sue 
the principal. The choice of the party to sue is therefore an important 
procedural step. In Meier v. Küchenmeister, decided in 1881, the Scottish 
                                                                                                             
 264. Priestly v. Fernie (1865) 159 Exch. Div. 820 (Eng.). 
 265. Meier v. Küchenmeister (1841) 8 R 642, 646 (Scot.). 
 266. Smith v. Anderson & Co. (1847) 9 D 702 (Scot.). 
 267. GEORGE J. BELL, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND § 224A (William 
Guthrie ed., 10th ed. 1899). MacPhail & Son v. Maclean’s Trs. (1887) 15 R 47 
(Scot.) is cited in addition to two English ones. 
 268. See supra note 62 for the individual Acts passed; see also Rodger, supra 
note 62. 
 269. MACGREGOR, supra note 62.  
 270. David Logan & Son Ltd. v. Schuldt (1903) 10 SLT 598 (Scot.); British 
Bata Shoe Co. Ltd. v. Double M. Shah Ltd. (1980) SC 311 (Scot.). 
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Inner House was at pains to distinguish English law271 on what amounted 
to election.272 The court confirmed that nothing short of judgment against 
one party amounted to election. According to Lord Justice-Clerk 
Moncreiff: “But where the master has not been sued to judgment, or the 
action fails from some technical reason or another, the case is different. 
The fact of the pursuer having sued the wrong man will not bar him from 
suing the right one.”273 
 The court may have been aware of confusion in English law on this 
point. There are several English cases, including one decided in 1987, 
which state that raising an action, but not pursuing it to decree, amounts to 
an election.274 Scots law differs from English law, treating the third party 
more leniently: only unequivocal conduct on the part of the third party will 
amount to election. 
Unidentified agency in Scots law was, until recently, unclear because 
of conflicting and ancient authority. The decision in Ferrier v. Dodds275 
suggested that the third party can elect which of the agent or the principal, 
once disclosed, to hold liable. In the edition of Bell’s Commentaries 
published after this case was decided, the editor analyzed the law almost 
exclusively through discussion of English cases.276 He nevertheless left 
open the possibility that the agent is liable only conditionally in the event 
that he fails to name the principal.277 In Lamont, Nisbet & Co. v. 
Hamilton,278 Lord President Dunedin suggested that the correct approach 
was to ask on whose credit or financial reputation the third party relied on 
when concluding the contract.279 This reliance identifies to whom the third 
party is contractually bound. On the facts, the agent alone was bound. It 
appears that, in Lamont, Ferrier was cited to the court. There is no 
suggestion that both principal and agent were bound. 
                                                                                                             
 271. Priestley v. Fernie (1865) 159 Exch. Div. 820 (Eng.). 
 272. Meier v. Küchenmeister (1881) 8 R 642 (Scot.). 
 273. Id. at 645. 
 274. Curtis v. Williamson (1874) 10 QB 57 (Eng.); United Austl. Ltd. v. 
Barclays Bank Ltd. (1941) 1 AC 30 (Eng.), per Lord Atkin; Clarkson Booker Ltd. 
v. Andjel (1964) 2 QB 775 (Eng.) and Chestertons v. Barone (1987) 1 EGLR 15, 
17 (Eng.), although doubt is cast on this line of authority in PETER WATTS & 
FRANCIS M.B. REYNOLDS, BOWSTEAD AND REYNOLDS ON AGENCY, ¶¶ 8–120, 
(21st ed. 2018). 
 275. Ferrier v. Dodds (1865) 3 M 561 (Scot.). 
 276. 1 GEORGE J. BELL, COMMENTARIES 540 (Lord McLaren ed., 7th ed. 1870).  
 277. Id.  
 278. Lamont, Nisbett, & Co. v. Hamilton (1907) SC 628 (Scot.). 
 279. Id. at 635. 
1036 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
 
 
The Scottish Inner House considered the issue in Ruddy v. Monte 
Marco.280 Qualified support was given to the credit or financial reputation 
approach. The first defender instructed the pursuer to carry out work on a 
casual basis. In the course of performing the work, Ruddy was injured. 
The question became which of the defenders had employed him. It was 
held that, in employing the pursuer, the first defender had acted as an agent 
for an unnamed—or unidentified—principal. The Inner House held that, 
in order to escape personal liability, the agent had to show that he 
expressly or impliedly negated personal liability.281 There is an interesting 
similarity to Louisiana law here: one will recall that article 3018 of the 
Civil Code places a duty on the agent to name his principal, and, if he does 
so, he escapes liability. Before this case was decided, no such duty 
appeared to exist in Scots law. The Inner House innovated in Scots law. 
The similar solutions to the problem of unidentified agency adopted 
by Louisiana law and Scots law have much to commend them. Each legal 
system provides the agent with an “escape route.” This represents a fair 
compromise between the interests of the various parties and promotes 
certainty, encouraging the agent to name the other party—the principal—
potentially liable. The solutions are also logical. It makes sense that the 
agent is liable to the third party; the agent is the party known to the third 
party. Although there is a risk of opportunistic behavior on the part of the 
agent—i.e., leaving open who the principal will be—that risk is minimal 
given the incentive on the agent to name the principal. In both cases, the 
mixed legal systems did not follow the solutions offered by the common 
law. In the case of Louisiana, the Minutes of the Revision Committee 
suggest a civilian source. There is no reason to suspect a civilian influence 
on the Scottish court: rather, it fashioned its own solution. 
VIII. COMPARATIVE REMARKS 
Looking at the early law of both Louisiana and Scotland, there are 
similarities. Both rest on a contract of mandate, and the contractual nature 
of mandate and agency continues in the modern law. Both also recognize 
direct representation; although the Digest of 1808 failed to focus on 
representation, it existed before that term was introduced into the Civil 
Code in 1997. 
Louisiana law and Scots law were subject to powerful common law 
influence at around the same time. The Louisiana Purchase in 1803 opened 
the gates to immigrants from other states and an influx of common 
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 281. Id. at 23. 
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lawyers.282 The following year, 1804, marked the first publication in 
Scotland of Bell’s Commentaries, the book which acted in undisclosed 
agency as a conduit for English influence. Despite this similarity, the 
conditions in each country were very different. The Louisiana population 
reacted against the prospect of imposition of the common law.283 A 
Digest—or Civil Code—was enacted in 1808; Louisiana did not adopt the 
common law. Crucially, the draft Commercial Code, the “mammoth 
undertaking that somehow missed its mark,”284 was not enacted. This 
would have entrenched the civilian tradition in commercial law matters. 
By contrast, there was no such radical clash of cultures between Scotland 
and England. In the early years of the 19th century, assimilation with 
English commercial law had begun in Scotland. At this stage, there is no 
evidence of assimilation in Louisiana if one considers the terms of the 
Civil Code and reported cases; however, assimilation may have been 
taking place on the ground due to commercial pressures. 
Turning to the role of the courts in each jurisdiction, judicial reception 
of the undisclosed principal in Louisiana was a painful and controversial 
process. Successive revolts against the importation of the common law 
took place in 1947, 1983, and even as recently as 1992. These revolts may 
be agency-specific examples of the wider civilian renaissance which took 
place in the second half of the 20th century in Louisiana.285 In 1992, the 
Supreme Court in Woodlawn expressed the clear desire to assimilate with 
commercial law in the other states of the Union. Scots law moved, by 
contrast, effortlessly towards adoption of English precedents, even where 
Scottish precedents were available. Vernon Palmer characterized the 
adoption by a mixed legal system of the common law as “a matter of 
choice, not compulsion.”286 In the context of undisclosed agency, this may 
be an example of “willing assimilation” by the courts.287 This can be seen 
if we compare two judicial statements in agency cases—although 
admittedly they are not contemporaneous.  
First, there is Justice Lemmon in the Louisiana Supreme Court: “In 
matters of commercial law, Louisiana has frequently taken steps to make 
our law uniform with other states.”288 Second, there is the dictum of Lord 
Justice-Clerk Boyle in the Scottish Inner House, already quoted: 
                                                                                                             
 282. DARGO, supra note 186, at xxi, 32. 
 283. Yiannopoulos, supra note 156. 
 284. Nathan, Jr., supra note 55, at 52. 
 285. PALMER, supra note 19, at 41. 
 286. Id. at 81. 
   287. Id. 
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In a case such as this, I do not object to reference to the law of 
England, which rides over almost the whole of our mercantile law; 
but we have the law both of the English and Scotch cases on this 
point expounded in Mr Bell’s work, who has seized the principles 
which run through those cases.289 
These are strong expressions of the attractions of common law 
jurisprudence. The common law offered an organized legal regime, in 
contrast with the disordered Scottish case law. In Scotland and Louisiana, 
there is likely to have been a strong desire to develop a single legal regime 
for a single market—extending to more than one nation, in the case of 
Scotland, and to more than one State, in the case of Louisiana. The courts 
in both systems are prime movers in the process of assimilation with the 
common law. 
Finally, consider the general role of the treatise writers in the 
development of undisclosed agency and agency law. The transformative 
influence in Scots law is Bell’s published works. In Louisiana law, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court relied on the work of Livermore, a local attorney 
and treatise writer. This Article has uncovered a Scottish–United States 
connection in agency law generally. This is the fact that Bell relied on the 
works of Kent and Story, and Kent and Story relied, in turn, on the works 
of Bell. The following paragraphs interrogate the reasons why these 
authors found each other’s work to be useful. 
Looking at the works of Bell, in Commentaries, if we compare the 
third edition—published in 1810—with the fourth edition—published in 
1821—the fourth contains a significantly greater number of references to 
the civil law in the discussion of mandate, principally Pothier, but also 
Italian and Dutch writers.290 These sources are not referred to where 
undisclosed agency is discussed: this is not surprising given the lack of 
undisclosed agency in the civil law.291 In the last edition of Principles 
published during Bell’s lifetime—1839292—in which mandate is 
                                                                                                             
 289. Stevenson v. Campbell (1836) 14 S 562 (Scot.) (the principal became 
disclosed during the course of dealing). See Carsewell v. Scotts (1839) 1 D 1215 
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discussed,293 the same civilian authors are cited and, in addition, Kent and 
Story.294 By 1839, Bell had clearly become aware of and had started to use 
the works of U.S. authors in addition to civilian ones. Kenneth Reid has 
noted the frequent appearance of references to Kent and Story’s works in 
this edition.295 Reid’s specific focus was not agency law, and the examples 
he gives are not drawn from agency law. 
Turning to the U.S. authors, Story promised, in the long title of his 
book, “occasional illustrations from the civil and foreign law.” He refers 
to the law in Continental Europe, including within that description Scots 
law, specifically Bell.296 Reid suggests that Kent cited Bell extensively, 
and Story cited Bell occasionally.297 U.S. courts referred to Bell’s work 
with surprising frequency at the time.298 By contrast, Bell’s work does not 
seem to have been influential in England.299  
In an article published in 1959, Kurt Nadelmann reproduced a letter 
from Story to Bell, written in very warm terms, acknowledging receipt of 
a copy of the 4th edition of Principles.300 This letter contains a passage 
which perhaps illustrates Story’s views on comparative law. He hoped: 
[T]he mutual studies of the jurisprudence of other countries will at 
no distant time lead the way to vast improvements in the science, 
and will gradually obliterate the anomalies and peculiarities of each, 
at least in all those cases, where the same principles and the same 
interests ought to lead to the same general results, for the benefit of 
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commerce and the intercourse of nations.301 
The eventual picture is a complex one. Scots law is used by the 
American treatise-writers as an example of the civil law, despite its mixed 
nature. The growth of undisclosed agency is roughly contemporaneous 
with Bell’s use of the works of American authors. His use of American 
works may have bolstered his adherence to the common law tradition in 
his treatment of agency.  
Others have explored the exchange of views between United States 
and Scottish legal authors in the 19th century, venturing reasons why it 
took place.302 This author would suggest, as a likely reason, the massive 
migration from Scotland to the United States taking place at this time,303 
as landowners in the Scottish Highlands cleared their lands of people for 
more profitable sheep-rearing.304 Granted, the majority of emigrants are 
unlikely to have come from the social class from which Scotland’s lawyers 
were drawn.305 Bell lived in Edinburgh—specifically, in Fountainbridge 
(close to the current author’s home). Though this is far from the Highlands, 
Bell was undoubtedly aware of these controversial events. The fact that 
such a large part of the Scottish population was emigrating to the United 
States could have bolstered Bell’s already-existing interest in the works of 
U.S. authors. Kent and Story, in turn, could have been drawn to Bell’s 
focus on bankruptcy. Richard Helmholz suggested that when citing 
foreign law, U.S. authors tended to refer to modern rather than ancient 
works.306 Bell’s works on bankruptcy could have been particularly useful 
at a time of huge economic growth in the United States. Finally, England 
may have been identified as the “enemy” at this time, rather than Great 
Britain, bearing in mind the events of the War of 1812. As a result, Scottish 
sources could have been more attractive to U.S. authors than English ones.   
CONCLUSION 
This Article has suggested a reexamination of our traditional 
characterization of undisclosed agency as a creation of the common law. 
Louisiana law and Scots law may have developed undisclosed agency as 
a practical necessity, in response to pressures exerted by international 
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trade. It may be no coincidence that both legal systems were, in the early 
19th century, involved extensively in international trade, including trading 
across the border with the common law neighbor. It seems unlikely that 
courts introduced it to either legal system as a legal transplant, effectively 
paving the way for a new way of trading using agents. This conclusion is 
important: it may be incorrect to continue to characterize undisclosed 
agency as the most important difference between the common law and the 
civil law in the context of agency law. Perhaps every legal system reaches 
towards an escape route from the confines of privity of contract when 
agents are used. 
In many ways, the comparison carried out in this Article tests, in an 
agency context, assumptions about the way mixed legal systems develop 
or behave. The first assumption is that, in commercial law matters, mixed 
legal systems assimilate entirely with the common law. The essential 
contention of this Article is that undisclosed agency developed in 
Louisiana law and Scots law in practice, and that the concepts are not legal 
transplants. Nevertheless, there is evidence of extensive assimilation, 
particularly in Scotland where a nascent Scottish concept is eventually 
replaced by an English one. Assimilation is not complete, however; certain 
parts of the law continue to be different. As for the speed of assimilation, 
those who have characterized it as gradual are correct in this particular 
context.307 
The second assumption this Article tested is that mixed legal systems 
contain legal rules that are examples of fusion between the civil law and 
the common law.308 In both countries, agency law as a whole is an example 
of fusion: the civilian basis of mandate is fused, or suffused, with the 
common law. The unique solutions developed by Louisiana and Scots law 
to unidentified agency are less obviously examples of fusion. In the case 
of Louisiana, the Revision Committee created the new approach, and in 
the case of Scotland, the Court of Session. In this context, the author does 
not agree with Holmes and Symeonides that a unique solution is 
necessarily a bad thing: these solutions have much to commend them. 
The third assumption tested is the idea that mixed legal systems can 
choose the best rule from either the civilian or common law tradition.309 
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There is little evidence of this phenomenon taking place in this agency 
context. Almost all of the comparative material before the Revision 
Committee was civilian in nature: there is no evidence in the Minutes of 
consideration of different common law approaches. There appears to have 
been no “weighing” of the solutions offered by the two different traditions. 
Interestingly, it was the law of another mixed legal system, Québec, which 
was the major point of reference for the Revision Committee. In Scots law, 
there is no evidence that the courts considered the solutions offered by the 
different legal traditions. This would, of course, be a difficult task in the 
context of deciding a case: the court would have to rely on counsel to cite 
the law of other legal systems. The Louisiana experience illustrates that 
revision of a Code can set a legal system on a different course. The only 
similar opportunity Scots law might have would be a law reform project 
carried out by the Scottish Law Commission (“SLC”). If the SLC 
considers agency law, Scots law could certainly learn from Louisiana 
law.310 
Returning to the question posed at the beginning of this Article, is a 
civil code “tough law,”311 acting to slow down or impede common law 
influence that would dilute the civil law? To answer this question in the 
agency context, compare the process of assimilation towards the common 
law in the codified system, Louisiana, to that of the uncodified system, 
Scotland. The Louisiana Civil Code does not seem to have had that effect 
in this context. The existence of provisions in the Digest of 1808 inimical 
to undisclosed agency did not impede its recognition by the Louisiana 
Supreme Court. Revision of the Code was painfully slow to arrive. In the 
uncodified system of Scotland, widespread use of English case law 
resulted in the virtual replacement of a nascent Scottish concept with an 
English one. Given that both mixed legal systems moved towards the 
common law, codification does not appear to have entrenched the civil law 
in the manner that Palmer has suggested. 
Just how long Louisiana law and Scots law will continue to differ 
remains to be seen. Scotland faces an uncertain future, as the United 
Kingdom leaves the European Union (“E.U.”). Given that the majority of 
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Scots voted against leaving the E.U., the United Kingdom’s exit may 
trigger a second Referendum on Scottish independence from the United 
Kingdom; Scotland’s political future will shape its law. If, as seems likely, 
it remains within the United Kingdom and leaves Europe, the dominant 
influence on Scots law is likely to be English law. If a further Referendum 
is triggered, and Scotland leaves the United Kingdom seeking reentry to 
the E.U., the dominant influence could well be European law. The author 
certainly hopes that the future for Louisiana law is, in contrast, more 
stable. 
 
